The Federal Preemption Question - A Federal Question - An Analysis of Federal Jurisdiction over Supremacy Clause Issues by Segreti, A. Mark, Jr.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1984
The Federal Preemption Question - A Federal
Question - An Analysis of Federal Jurisdiction over
Supremacy Clause Issues
A. Mark Segreti Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
A. Mark Segreti Jr., The Federal Preemption Question - A Federal Question - An Analysis of Federal Jurisdiction over Supremacy
Clause Issues, 33 Clev. St. L. Rev. 653 (1984-1985)
THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION QUESTION-A FEDERAL
QUESTION? AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
OVER SUPREMACY CLAUSE ISSUES
A. MARK SEGRETI, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION ....... ................... 653
II. DETERMINATION OF FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION FROM
THE PLAINTIFF'S "WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT" . ........... 659
i11. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE "AGGRESSOR AS MASTER" RA-
T IO N ALE .. .. . ................... .......... ... .. .. .. . 66 5
A . Introduction ..................................... 665
B. Misdirection of Gully, Skelly Oil and Wycoff .... 666
C. Federal Declaratory Judgments: Recent Application
of Jurisdictional Doctrine ......................... 675
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND REMOVAL JURISDICTION ......... 683
A . Introduction ........... ......................... 683
B. Removal of State Actions for Coercive Relief ....... 684
1. Federal Preemption: The Claim or Defense Di-
lem m a .............. ........................ 685
2. Determining the Extent of Federal Preemption .. 689
C. Removal of State Actions for Declaratory Relief .... 696
V. CONCLUSION .............................................. 705
I INTRODUCTION
here is much recent concern about the volume of litigation in the
federal courts.' Chief Justice Burger sees the issue as an educational
one and has suggested that law schools emphasize the resolution of dis-
* A.B. 1967, Wittenberg University; J.D. 1970, Ohio State University. Member, Ohio Bar.
Attorney, Bieser, Greer & Landis, Dayton, Ohio.
' In fiscal year 1982, 183,098 civil actions were initiated in the United States District
Courts. DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 96
(1983). Civil actions not involving the United States as a party, and based on "federal ques-
tion" jurisdiction, totaled 79,197. Id. at 98. However, prisoner petitions totaled over 29,000,
social security claims almost 13,000 and bankruptcy actions over 2,300. Id. at 99. Thus,
approximately 35,000 were civil actions between private parties based on federal law.
Comparatively, 1,639,518 civil actions were filed in the state courts of California alone.
Flango and Eisner, The Latest State Court Caseload Data, 7 STATE CT. J. 16, 18 (1983).
Despite federal court publicity, the bulk of civil litigation is done in the state courts. Behind
California followed New York at 793,896, Texas at 679,107, Illinois at 647,096, and Ohio at
619,043. Id.
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putes without litigation, rather than promoting litigation by stressing ad-
vocacy skills and the adversary nature of the legal process.'
In the face of this rhetoric, the Supreme Court has continued to base
the question of access to the federal courts on rationale akin to "trial by
combat." Rather than recognizing the courts as just one of many dispute-
resolving mechanisms available in our society, the Court has determined
the jurisdictional question by favoring the party it views as the aggressor.
The assumption of such an approach is that the courts are a forum for
battle initiated by the aggrieved or injured party. In other words, the of-
fended pugilist has the right to choose the forum of battle to vindicate its
honor.
Undoubtedly, an injured party is an initiator of court action. However,
a dispute is often a continuum of actions and reactions The disputant
who resorts to litigation may be no more or less an aggressor than the
other disputant. Often there is no clear wrongdoer, and both disputants
are taking positions based on legal authority.
One area where this jurisdictional doctrine has surfaced is where one
disputant asserts that the laws adopted by the Congress of the United
States preempt laws adopted by the states. The assertion produces a co-
rollary jurisdictional question of substantial import: whether the issue of
the supremacy of federal law over state law is to be decided primarily by
state courts or federal courts. The issue involves the relationship of fed-
eral jurisdiction doctrines derived from article III of the United States
Constitution and the doctrine of the supremacy of federal law contained
in article VI of the United States Constitution.'
Due to the growth of our federal government, federal legislation now
deals with many issues previously within the domain of state and local
governments. Both Congress and the state legislatures enact laws gov-
erning the same conduct, resulting in conflicting regulatory standards.
2 Burger, Isn't There a Better Way, 68 A.B.A J_ 274, 275 (1982).
See W. McLAUGHLAN, AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESSES 9 (1977); P. CARRINGTON & B. BAB-
COCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 1 (3d ed.
1983).
' The judicial power of the federal courts over federal cases is based on U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2: "The Judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made .... " The doctrine of
federal preemption is based on U.S. CONST. art. VI which provides that the laws of the
United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819). Pursuant to this authority Congress may enact federal laws that pre-
empt state laws in a regulatory area. In other words, Congress may provide expressly that its
law shall govern a given dispute in lieu of state law. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The courts have found this congressional intent where Congress has
enacted comprehensive statutory schemes that do not leave room for state regulation of the
particular conduct. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919).
They have also found preemption where the state law conflicts with federal law. Florida




Often a state agency is pursuing an entity also regulated by federal law.
The disputants disagree on whether the regulated activity is governed by
federal or state law. They also may not agree on whether their dispute
over the regulated conduct should be heard in federal or state court. The
validity of the choice of a federal forum is based on the premise that the
dispute "arises under" the federal law and not the state law.*
Logically, a dispute involving conduct regulated by a federal statute
that preempts state law would be a case "arising under" federal law au-
thorizing federal court jurisdiction. Commentators have assumed this to
be the case.' However, the federal courts have determined this issue on
6 Federal courts, like all courts, are courts of limited jurisdiction in the generic sense of
the term. In the technical sense, federal courts are limited to specific types of cases while
most state trial courts are not limited by the subject matter except in certain specific areas
where state legislatures have created special courts, e.g., to hear juvenile matters, probate
matters, or domestic disputes. F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 35 (2d ed.
1977)[hereinafter cited as JAMES & HAZARD].
In 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), Congress provided the federal district court with original juris-
diction over civil cases "arising under" the Constitution, or other federal laws. This original
jurisdiction is considered to be less than the full article III judicial power. Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
There is confusion in many discussions of federal court jurisdiction between the court's
authority to grant particular forms of relief and the court's authority to entertain the case.
In Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950), Justice Frankfurter de-
fined jurisdiction in the sense of the power of the federal courts to entertain litigation as
"the kinds of issues which give right of entrance to federal courts." Id. at 671 This defini-
tion distinguishes the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case from no-
tions of jurisdiction related to the type of relief requested. For example, prior to the merger
of law and equity into one civil action, the jurisdiction of each was often based on the type
of remedies available. Thus, equity had "jurisdiction" if the legal remedy was inadequate. D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.7 (1973)[hereinafter cited as DOBBS]. In
fact, section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided "that suits in equity shall not be
sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and
complete remedy may be had at law." 1 Stat. 73 (1789). However, U.S. CONST. art. III § 2
extends judicial power to "all cases, in Law and Equity," basing federal court jurisdiction on
the subject matter and the parties involved, rather than the relief requested. Federal courts
were given judicial authority over common law cases and cases traditionally handled in eq-
uity to "put right an injustice." R. MEGARRY AND P. BAKER, SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 6
(26 ed. 1966).
Over the years, the subject of federal question jurisdiction has received significant discus-
sion. See Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MICH. L. REV. 17
(1946); Chadburn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L REV. 639
(1942); Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly" under
Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV, 890 (1967); Forrester, The Nature of a Federal Question, 16
TUL. L. REV. 362 (1942); Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 TUL. L.
REV. 263 (1943); Fraser, Some Problems in Federal Question Jurisdiction, 49 MICH. L. REV.
73 (1950); London, "Federal Question" Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion, 57 MICH. L.
REV. 835 (1959); Mishkin, The "Federal Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
157 (1953); Willard, When Does a Case "Arise" under Federal Laws?, 45 AM. L. REV. 373
(1911).
8 See 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722,
1984-85]
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the basis of which party raises the issue in the pleadings and whether the
issue is an essential part of the right of action asserted. Essentially, if the
plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim based on federal law then there is
federal court jurisdiction. If the defendant raises federal law defensively,
the case does not "arise under" federal law. 7 Despite the preemptive na-
at 567-69 (1976)[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER]; M. REDISH, FEDERAL JU-
RISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 63 (1980). Professor Redish
points out that the issue of whether Congress has preempted state law is "a federal ques-
tion, capable of determination by a federal court .... " Id. However, it is unclear whether
he was referring to original federal jurisdiction in the district courts as opposed to federal
jurisdiction generally.
Federal preemption is the ultimate principle of our federalism. It establishes the
supremacy of federal substantive law. Federal jurisdiction is limited as an accommodation
to the sovereignty of the state courts. The question is whether the protection of limited
federal court jurisdiction permits state courts to be the primary decision makers in deciding
whether a federal substantive law supersedes a state substantive law.
It is contradictory to interpret federal jurisdiction so that state courts have the primary
opportunity to decide Supremacy Clause issues. Such a restrictive approach carries the con-
cept of limited federal jurisdiction to an inappropriate extreme. In seeking to protect state
court sovereignty from the intrusion of federal court authority, this approach makes state
courts the primary decision makers of the ultimate federalism issue as to the governing
substantive law. The procedural issue of jurisdiction is permitted to control the substantive
constitutional issue of which sovereign's rules of decision govern.
' For example, the courts often characterize federal preemption as a defense and, there-
fore, not an adequate basis for federal question jurisdiction. See Lawrence County v. South
Dakota, 668 F.2d 27, 31 (8th Cir. 1982); First Nat'l Bank v. Aberdeen Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d
843, 850-53 (8th Cir. 1980)(en banc).
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 553 (1973), expressed the
view that federal preemption of state law under the Supremacy Clause may be the basis of a
federal claim sufficient for federal question jurisdiction. Thus, federal preemption of state
law also may be an essential element of the claim.
United States Supreme Court decisions have divided federal question jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) into two distinct areas, both governed by the plaintiff's cause of
action. In the first area there is no discretion. If the cause of action is created by federal law,
the federal district court has jurisdiction. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,
241 U.S. 257 (1916). If the cause of action is created by state law, there may be federal
district court jurisdiction if granting relief is dependent upon the construction of a substan-
tial question of federal law. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
In the latter area, the federal courts have used the "well-pleaded complaint" rule as a
discretionary vehicle to limit the number of such cases that may be heard in the federal
district courts. It provides latitude for choosing which federal questions are sufficient and
which are not.
The development and use of this doctrine has been fostered by the Supreme Court. Prior
to 1983, three Supreme Court decisions have been the primary authority for use of this
doctrine: Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Gully v. First Nat'l
Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); and Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908). At the end of its 1983 spring term, the Supreme Court added Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) to the federal question jurispru-
dence. Unfortunately, the Court's latest attempt to define "arising under" only perpetuated,





ture of federal law in the dispute, federal court authority to hear the dis-
pute depends on the mechanics of pleading practice.
Careful analysis demonstrates that basing jurisdiction on rules of
pleading is superficial and confusing. The constitutional basis of the doc-
trine of federal preemption, as well as its exceptional stature in other ju-
risdictional contexts, emphasizes that federal question jurisdiction should
be cognizable where federal law controls the dispute. The existing plead-
ing analysis ignores the basis of federal court jurisdiction in the very area
where federal policy has been declared to be preeminent.
Furthermore, the "proper-pleading" approach for determining jurisdic-
tion has not worked well. The precise meaning of the simple phrase "aris-
ing under" is uncertain. The federal courts have been unable to develop a
reasonably clear test for determining what cases arise under federal law
and what cases do not. As one commentator has observed: "One of the
most perplexing exercises in American law practice is the effort to define
with certainty the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in mat-
ters where there is no diversity of citizenship."'
Of course, the Supreme Court is responsible for the problem; its deci-
sions have established an unacceptable framework for the lower courts to
apply in determining their jurisdiction.
A central theme of this Article is that subject matter jurisdiction is a
procedural doctrine and should function as such. Nothing is more impor-
tant for procedure than simplicity and predictability. A doctrine gov-
erning access to the federal courts should be understandable, usable, and
predictable. It should not be the subject of numerous judicial opinions.9
The Franchise Tax Bd. decision is particularly significant to this discussion because it is
the only Supreme Court decision in this century addressing "arising under" jurisdiction
with regard to an assertion that federal law preempts state law. A critical analysis of the
Franchise Tax Bd. opinion will follow a brief description of the development of the existing
jurisdictional doctrine.
' London, supra note 5, at 835. Some lower federal courts have made a similar observa-
tion. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1982).
Other judges have not been sympathetic about this problem. In Lawrence County v. South
Dakota, 668 F.2d 27, 28 (8th Cir. 1982), Judge Bright stated: "The precedential value of this
case lies in its message to the practicing bar. Parties and their counsel should not bring
cases to the federal courts without first making sure of the existence of federal jurisdiction."
In 1982, there were ten circuit courts of appeals decisions involving federal question
jurisdiction based on an assertion of federal preemption: Alton Box Rd. Co. v. Esprit De
Corps, 682 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Detroit Bond & Mort-
gage Inv. Co., 687 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1982); Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d
323 (2d Cir. 1982) aff'd sub nom. Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 463 U.S. 1220
(1983); Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1982); Lawrence County
v. South Dakota, 668 F.2d 27 (8th Cir. 1982); Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 683
F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1983); Lafferty v. Solar Turbines Int'l, 666 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1982); First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1982); City Nat'l Bank v. Edmis-
ten, 681 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1982); and Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 1. In Franchise Tax Bd., the jurisdic-
1984-851
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Although procedural, subject matter jurisdiction is highly significant.
The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even
initially in the Supreme Court."° The institutional concern that a court
only decide matters within its jurisdiction may overshadow the signifi-
cance of the dispute and the substantive issues involved. Thus, this pro-
cedural issue remains an unknown variable lurking in the crowd of sub-
stantive issues. It may be invoked to nullify judicial efforts to resolve a
dispute after the expenditure of extensive resources by the parties and
the courts. 1I
The existing judicial analysis of federal question jurisdiction has not
met the test of simplicity and predictability required of procedural law. It
has consumed an undue amount of judicial resources. 2 The uncertainty
surrounding subject matter jurisdiction is not justifiable, especially when
crowded court dockets threaten the administration of justice. An unwork-
able test should not continue merely because a few previous Supreme
Court decisions have parroted it as dogma. Such a test is particularly
troublesome and illogical when it results in a case governed by preemp-
tive federal law being deemed as not "arising under" federal law. Rather,
a more logical and usable test should be adopted.
Furthermore, the Court's jurisdictional doctrine favors the aggressive
disputant. The "aggressor as master" rationale enables the more hostile
disputant's description of the dispute to control the forum of its
resolution.
This approach is contrary to current notions that litigation is merely a
step in the process of resolving disputes rather than a forum for battle to
vindicate the "injured" party's interests. The jurisdiction of the federal
courts to hear a legal issue should not depend on a combative classifica-
tion of the disputants.
This Article focuses on the issue of simplicity and predictability in ana-
lyzing federal question jurisdiction and recommends making federal court
jurisdiction, in the area of federal preemption, consistent with logic. Fed-
eral question jurisdiction should be based on the source of the controlling
substantive law. This approach is more logical, and therefore easier to
understand. It is also more certain and therefore more predictable since it
bases jurisdiction on the more realistic standard of governing law, rather
than on speculation as to which party is the aggressor.
This Article is not a recommendation to expand federal court jurisdic-
tional issue was discussed only by the dissent.
1* FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h). See infra note 19. This principle is exemplified by the Mottley
case, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), in which lack of jurisdiction was raised initially by the Supreme
Court, and the Franchise Tax Bd. case, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), in which an action for $380.56 in
taxes was found to be outside the district court's jurisdiction by the Supreme Court after
the merits had been heard by the district court and the court of appeals.
" See infra note 19.




tion; it is a recommendation that federal question jurisdiction, at least in
the area of federal preemption, function as a procedural doctrine. It is
hoped that the result would be a reduction in "procedural" litigation.
Although the Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue in
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,13 it has
not resolved the difficulties involved in its pleading analysis. The
Franchise Tax Board decision looked at the jurisdictional issue in the
context of a state declaratory judgment action that had been removed to
federal court. A critical analysis of the decision will be made after explor-
ing the development of the existing doctrine.
II. DETERMINATION OF FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION FROM THE
PLAINTIFF'S "WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT"
It is the so-called "well-pleaded complaint" rule that prevents a finding
of jurisdiction based on federal preemption of state law. In fact, the claim
that federal law preempts state law was at issue in a Supreme Court deci-
sion viewed as originating the well-pleaded complaint rule.' 4 In Gold-
Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, 5 the owners of agricultural lands adja-
cent to the Bear River in California brought a private nuisance action to
enjoin the mining company from depositing its tailings and debris into a
channel of the river. The company demurred to the complaint and peti-
tioned for removal to federal court. The lower federal court remanded the
case to state court for lack of federal court jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court affirmed the remand because the assertions of federal preemption
were improperly pleaded as conclusions of law, not as specific facts. Ac-
cordingly, the federal courts would decide the jurisdictional issue only on
the basis of properly pleaded allegations.
In Louisville & Nashville Railaroad v. Mottley,5 the United States Su-
preme Court applied the "proper pleading" rule to an original action in
federal district court. In fact, the Court further restricted the inquiry.
Federal jurisdiction must be presented by properly pleaded allegations
13 463 U.S. 1, (1983).
1" A LI. STUDY OF THE DIvISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
169 (1969)[hereinafter cited as A.L.I. STUDY]. Professor Hornstein asserts that Metcalf v.
Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888), established the well-pleaded complaint rule. Hornstein,
Federalism, Judicial Power and the "Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A
Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563, 608 (1981). Certainly Metcalf addressed the com-
plaint specifically and in the context of an original action.
-5 96 U.S. 199 (1877). Interestingly, the Gold-Washing case did not limit its inquiry to
the plaintiff's initial pleading. Of course, the Court construed the removal statute prior to
the congressional amendment equating removal jurisdiction expressly with original federal
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Court looked for jurisdictional facts in the record, not merely
in the plaintiff's complaint. See Trautman, Federal Right Jurisdiction and the Declaratory
Remedy, 7 VAND. L. REV. 445, 452 (1954).
-- 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
1984-85]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
and those allegations must be in the plaintiff's complaint. The Court
stated that federal jurisdiction exists in an action arising under the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States "only when the plaintiffs state-
ment of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or
that Constitution.' 1 7 Improperly anticipating a defense and asserting that
the defense is unconstitutional would not be sufficient."8 The allegations
essential to plaintiff's claim were the sole source for determining federal
court jurisdiction.
Three separate rationales support restricting the inquiry to the plain-
tiff's initial pleading. First, the restriction is a corollary of the notion that
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Thus, it is incumbent on
the plaintiff to demonstrate federal jurisdiction.9 Second, the restriction
addresses the concern that jurisdiction be determined at the earliest pos-
' Id. at 152.
16 Id. The common law pleading rule was that each party was to make out his own case
or defense. Anticipating the other party's defense was, "according to Hale, C.J .... 'like
leaping before one comes to the stile.'" B. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING
428-29 (2d ed. 1895). On demurrer, such anticipatory allegations would be disregarded.
" There is no presumption that federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a
specific type of case. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1206,
at 75 (1969)[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. Therefore, it is incumbent on the one
presenting the case to the federal forum to establish jurisdiction. As stated in Ramirez &
Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594, 597 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd 245
F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1959): "Jurisdiction is the threshold
issue in every case in the federal courts ... so the first question is whether the facts exist
'upon which the court's jurisdiction depends.'"
The requirement that the plaintiff affirmatively plead jurisdiction was found in former
Equity Rule 25 which required that the initial bill contain "a short and plain statement of
the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends." The Equity Rules of 1912 became
effective in 1913. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WESCHLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 665 (2d ed. 1973)[hereinafter cited as HART
AND WECHSLER]. The same requirement is now contained in FED. R. CIv. P. 8.
However, FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) makes the question of the lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion a non-waivable defense. The language used may be traced to section 80 of the Judiciary
Act of 1875. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdic-
tion Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 511 (1967). The concern that the court
may exercise judicial power in other than a few prescribed circumstances has greater histori-
cal importance than the concern of the parties that the dispute be resolved. See Mansfield,
Coldwater & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884). The doctrine that jurisdiction of the
subject matter may be challenged at any time, see Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.)
126 (1804), forms the basis of Rule 12(h).
The inequity to the parties due to belated "discovery" that the lower federal court lacked
jurisdiction is demonstrated by Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), where the issue was initially
raised in the Supreme Court. The American Law Institute has recommended a procedure
for foreclosing the jurisdictional issue after the commencement of trial. A.L.I. STUDY, supra
note 14, at 366-69. There is case law prior to the Federal Equity Rules which supports this
view. In Smith v. Kernochen, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 198 (1849), the Supreme Court held that
subject matter jurisdiction had to be raised by a plea in abatement: "The objection came too





sible time in the litigation.2" Third, the restriction reflects the belief that
a plaintiff should be able to choose the controlling law and the forum.2
The aggressive action of filing suit entitles one to be the master of the
applicable law. 2 This "aggressor as master" rationale is the most signifi-
20 Resolving whether the case is in the right court immediately upon filing is more effi-
cient than doing so after the parties have used the court to inquire into the controversy.
Limiting the inquiry to the properly pleaded allegations in the first pleading was intended
to make the determination easier and more certain.
It is paradoxical that the Supreme Court shifted the inquiry in federal declaratory judg-
ment actions, not merely away from the proper allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, but
to speculations about potential claims not yet filed. See infra note 22. This shift indicates
that the "aggressor as master" rationale overshadows other reasons for the well-pleaded
complaint rule. See infra notes 21 and 22.
Also, the doctrine that the lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be decided at any time
emphasizes that timeliness is not the essence of the determination. See supra note 19. Juris-
dictional correctness is an institutional value of more significance than the individual dis-
pute. Fundamentally, therefore, basing the jurisdictional determination on the initial paper
filed in the action merely because it is the earliest time the determination could be made is
faulty reasoning. The complaint should be a guidepost in assessing the nature of the action.
It is not the beginning or the end of the issue. However, the Supreme Court has been preoc-
cupied with determining jurisdiction "at the earliest possible time." Union of America v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 481 (1957)("jurisdiction must be judged at the outset"). Of
course, Metcalf, 128 U.S. 586 (1888), see supra note 14, and Tennessee v. Union & Planters'
Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894), used similar language regarding determination of jurisdiction "at
the outset."
" The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913); Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U.S. 656, 662-63 (1961). The plaintiff, as master of the claim,
has the right to determine whether the case may be removed. In Great N. Ry. v. Alexander,
246 U.S. 276, 283 (1918), the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he plaintiff may by the allega-
tions of his complaint determine the status with respect to removability of a case. . . when
it is commenced .... "
On the other hand, the court is not bound by the plaintiff's description of the claim. The
court may examine the complaint to assure itself that the plaintiff is not pleading to circum-
vent the defendant's right to a federal forum. See 14 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note
6, § 3722, at 564; see also City of Galveston v. Int'l Org. of Master, Mates & Pilots, 338 F.
Supp. 907, 909 (S.D. Tex. 1972). In an attempt to avoid removal jurisdiction, a claim may be
misrepresented as a state claim by artful pleading.
Federal preemption is a factor in many of these "artful pleading" cases. See, e.g., Hearst
Corp. v. Shopping Center Network, 307 F. Supp. 551, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In fact, federal
preemption has been used to trigger court inquiry to determine if artful pleading is involved
in the jurisdictional issue. Eversolve v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 500 F. Supp. 1162, 1170
(C.D. Cal. 1980).
2 The "aggressor-defender" distinction was emphasized by Justice Jackson in Public
Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248-49 (1952), see infra note 40 and accompany-
ing text, addressing the jurisdictional issue in a declaratory judgment action. Since declara-
tory relief is not coercive and does not seek immediate enforcement, the declaratory plain-
tiff is somehow less a master of the action. In effect, the declaratory plaintiff is acting
defensively to avoid the necessity for more aggressive coercive relief. Traditionally, the
plaintiff's right to control the claim was based on the request for coercive relief. Therefore,
the declaratory plaintiff, unlike the traditional plaintiff, does not have a right to control the
claim.
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cant underlying basis for rejecting federal question jurisdiction over fed-
eral preemption issues.
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.23 represents an early aberra-
tion from the well-pleaded complaint rule. The plaintiff, an objecting
shareholder, alleged that the trust company invested funds under an un-
constitutional federal law. Rather than assessing the correctness of the
pleading, the Supreme Court looked to the plaintiffs claim to determine
whether "the right to relief depends upon the construction or application
of the Constitution or laws of the United States .... ,24 It found federal
jurisdiction, stating: "It is . . . apparent that the controversy concerns
the constitutional validity of an act of Congress which is directly drawn in
question.
' 's
Justice Holmes, dissenting, argued for a denial of jurisdiction due to
anticipatory pleading of the federal issue. He argued that state law was
the basis of the plaintiffs claim of illegal investments by the corporate
directors; state law created plaintiffs right of action. Thus, plaintiff's bill
anticipated the defendant's reliance on the federal statute and responded
that it was unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, the majority of the Supreme Court found jurisdiction. It
" 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
2, Id. at 199.
2 Id. at 201. There has been some question as to the continued vitality of Smith. In
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205 (1934), the Supreme Court found that
there was a need to interpret federal law but that the cause of action was based in state law.
The state law defined liability in terms of federal safety standards. Presumably, the plain-
tiff's claim was not based directly on federal law. The Supreme Court denied federal ques-
tion jurisdiction. Many commentators suggest that Moore indicated an implicit rejection of
Smith. D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 197 (3d ed. 1982); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 67 (1980); Greene, Hybrid State Law in
the Federal Courts, 83 HARV. L. REV. 289, 323 (1969); London, "Federal Question" Jurisdic-
tion-A Snare and A Delusion, 57 MICH. L. REV. 835, 853 (1959). However, in Moore federal
law was incorporated as an evidentiary standard of care for the imposition of state liability.
It did not control all elements of the claim and may not have controlled the dispute. It
appears that Justice Holmes' comment in his dissent in Smith covered the Moore situation:
"The mere adoption by a state law of a United States Law as a criterion or test, when the
law of the United States has no force proprio vigore, does not cause a case under state law
to be also a case under the law of the United States .... " Smith, 255 U.S. at 215.
Of course, Justice Brennan's dissent in Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), deline-
ated the continuing authority of Smith. Also, Smith was authority in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678 (1946) and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978),
actions based directly on the Constitution itself. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9, referred to Smith as an acceptable approach to the juris-
dictional question.
Furthermore, the Moore decision was actually a venue ruling. Venue carried depending on
whether the action was one "arising under" the Federal Safety Appliance Act or whether
jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction
rested on diversity of citizenship grounds. 191 U.S. at 211; see HART AND WECHSLER, supra




reasoned that the plaintiff's pleading demonstrated that resolution of the
controversy depended on a decision of federal law. The demonstration of
a need for a decision under federal law was sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion on the federal court, despite the niceties of the rules of pleading.
The assertion that federal preemption of state law is a sufficient basis
for federal question jurisdiction finds itself between the seemingly contra-
dictory well-pleaded complaint rule and the Smith rationale. Certainly,
federal preemption may mean that the right to relief depends on a con-
struction of federal law within Smith. On the other hand, federal preemp-
tion is raised generally by the defendant or the declaratory plaintiff as an
avenue for avoiding the asserted liability under state law. Under the well-
pleaded complaint approach, however, it is anticipatory pleading.
In Gully v. First National Bank,2" Justice Cardozo applied the proper
pleading rule in a case removed from state to federal court. A federal
district court could assert jurisdiction over a removed state court action
only if the case could have been brought originally in federal court.2" As
in Mottley, the Supreme Court looked to the plaintiffs complaint and
assessed its "true" character as federal or state. To a large extent, the
assessment was based on Justice Holmes' "creation" test in American
Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.2 s This test calls for a "kaleido-
scopic" search for the body of law which created the plaintiff's alleged
right of action.29 The search is limited to the allegations in the complaint
that describe the plaintiff's cause of action. The Supreme Court did not
sanction resort to improperly pleaded allegations anticipating defenses or
replying to probable defenses as suitable for this jurisdictional inquiry. If
the properly pleaded right of action was created by state law, removal was
improper because the case did not "arise under" federal law.3 °
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act"' posed some difficulty for the
well-pleaded complaint rule. The notion that the plaintiff, acting aggres-
sively by seeking court action, should be able to control what forum hears
299 U.S. 109 (1936).
z The present scheme of removal can be traced to the Judiciary Act amendments of
1887. Removal jurisdiction, under the general removal provisions, is related directly to origi-
nal jurisdiction. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 1193.
28 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
20 Gully, 299 U.S. at 117. One may view Gully as an attempt to refine the Holmes' crea-
tion test. Even though the technical cause of action was created by state law, its "essence"
may be based in federal law. However, Gully actually applied to the cases where state law
has created the cause of action but there is a need to construe a substantial matter of fed-
eral law. Smith, 255 U.S. 180 (1921). Justice Cardozo was attempting to use the American
Well Works test by analogy to the situation involving state causes of action. Thus, the crea-
tion test is appropriate to determine the cases included within "arising under" jurisdiction
but not the cases to be ruled outside district court jurisdiction. See supra note 5. See also
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964).
" 299 U.S. at 113.
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1982), 48 Stat. 955 (1934).
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the dispute is a significant underpinning of the well-pleaded complaint
rule. With the declaratory judgment device, the less aggressive disputant
is often the initiator seeking to forestall a more traditional action
threatened by the more aggressive disputant.
In the traditional action, the plaintiff is the aggressor in the sense that
he initiates the legal proceedings to obtain affirmative relief. The plaintiff
is seeking damages allegedly due to the defendant's past conduct or is
seeking to restrain conduct threatening irreparable harm. The plaintiff is
asserting that the defendant has committed, or is about to commit, a
wrong against him and that affirmative relief is warranted. The aggressive
action of bringing the case to the court for coercive relief supports the
plaintiff's claim to the right to control what law governs the dispute, and
more specifically, what forum will decide the dispute.3 2 The relief the
plaintiff seeks is coercive because it is based on the claim that the defen-
dant is injuring the plaintiff. The assumption in these cases is that the
courts exist to remedy actual wrongs. The courts are established to pro-
tect the party asserting that a wrong has been committed and that an
injury has resulted.
On the other hand, the plaintiff who brings the declaratory judgment
action is often anticipating legal action by another party, and is seeking a
judicial resolution of the disputed issue as a defensive action. The declar-
atory judgment device allows the "defending" disputant to have a judicial
declaration on the matter without waiting until damages are incurred or
until irreparable injury is imminent.33 The declaratory plaintiff merely
needs to show that some legal interest is in jeopardy due to the uncer-
tainty of conflicting claims. 34 By its very nature, the device is anticipatory
in that it attempts to avoid the necessity for more traditional coercive
remedies.
Despite the reversal of the parties' roles, the Supreme Court in Skelly
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.35 applied the proper-pleading approach
and held that federal question jurisdiction depends on which disputant
initiates the declaratory judgment action. If the declaratory judgment
plaintiff is seeking judicial resolution based on a federal defense to an
alleged state-created right asserted by the declaratory defendant, federal
jurisdiction is lacking. If the declaratory plaintiff is seeking resolution
based on a federal claim, and the declaratory defendant is relying on a
defense based on state law, the federal court would have jurisdiction. The
Court reasoned that jurisdiction must be determined from the well-
pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint.36 The defending declara-
32 See supra note 21.
11 E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 25 (1934).
34 Id.
3 339 U.S. 667 (1950).




tory plaintiff, although pleading properly for purposes of the Declaratory
Judgment Act, is not pleading properly under common law rules predat-
ing the declaratory judgment device. Under Skelly Oil, the defensive na-
ture of the declaratory plaintiffs' assertion deprives the federal district
courts of jurisdiction.3 7
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE "AGGRESSOR AS MASTER" RATIONALE
A. Introduction
The federal courts have deemed Gully"8 and Skelly Oil" controlling in
federal preemption cases. The jurisdictional issue has been addressed
both under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for cases initiated in federal district court
and under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) for cases removed from state court to fed-
eral district court.
In both instances, the principles of Gully, Skelly Oil and the dictum in
Public Service Commission v. Wycoff4" have expanded the well-pleaded
complaint rule to an unfortunate extent. The "aggressor as master" ra-
tionale of the well-pleaded complaint rule has controlled the result, tak-
ing the courts far from the simple phrase "arising under." The result has
been a highly technical, very unpredictable, effectively discretionary juris-
dictional doctrine. A close look at each of these cases will demonstrate
that Gully has been applied improperly, that Shelly Oil should be re-
jected, and that the Wycoff dictum was unfortunate. Nevertheless, these
three Supreme Court decisions continue to dictate to the lower federal
courts that, in most situations, a dispute which may be governed by pre-
emptive federal substantive law is not within the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict courts. The conclusion reached under this well-pleaded complaint
approach has varied, based on the relief requested by the plaintiff in both
original federal actions and in removed actions. The relief requested is
the talisman for characterizing the action as aggressive or defensive in
nature.
The "aggressor as master" rationale of the well-pleaded complaint rule
has been particularly significant in declaratory judgment actions and re-
moval actions. In the former, a "nonaggressor" is able to initiate the court
action. In removal actions, the defendant is able to change the aggressive
plaintiff's choice of forum by exercising the right to remove granted by
Congress. These procedural devices allow the defending party to select
the forum, and the courts have restricted the jurisdictional inquiry to the
aggressor's initial pleading. In the declaratory relief cases the courts have
" Trautman, supra note 15, at 463.
"' 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
39 399 U.S. 667 (1956).
4° 344 U.S. 237 (1952); see supra note 22.
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created a hypothetical aggressor and shifted the jurisdictional analysis to
that party's potential claim. This restricted inquiry is based on Gully,
Skelly Oil and Wycoff.
B. Misdirection of Gully, Skelly Oil and Wycoff
Although it was not a federal declaratory judgment action, Gully is
cited as authority for rejecting jurisdiction where a declaratory plaintiff
asserts federal preemption. On the one hand, Gully supports the proposi-
tion that federal law must be an essential element of a plaintiff's claim."'
On the other hand, it restricts the jurisdictional inquiry to the allegations
constituting plaintiff's cause of action, removing from consideration alle-
gations anticipating or replying to probable defenses.' 2 Thus, Gully con-
tains both an emphasis upon the essential nature of the claim and an
41 299 U.S. at 113. Courts and commentators have noted the apparent paradox of insist-
ing on finding the "basic" and "necessary" dispute and yet limiting the inquiry to the com-
plaint. American Invs.-Co Countryside, Inc. v. Riverdale Bank, 596 F.2d 211, 216 n.8 (7th
Cir. 1979); see 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 6, § 3562, at 411.
The major thrust of Gully, however, is determining whether the dispute involves a federal
issue that is merely "lurking in the bankground." 299 U.S. at 117.
The Gully decision may be criticized on another point. A close reading of the decision
indicates judicial distaste for the removal statute. It described the state court action as fol-
lows: "A dispute so doubtful and conjectural, so far removed from plain necessity, is un-
availing to extinguish the jurisdiction of the states." 299 U.S. at 117 (emphasis added). This
description points out that an underlying purpose of Gully was to limit removal. The Gully
court fashioned a narrow view of federal question jurisdiction to limit the extinquishment of
state court jurisdiction.
Of course, the existence of federal question jurisdiction under 28 US.C. § 1331 or its
precedessor, did not extinguish state court jurisdiction. Generally, state courts of general
jurisdiction (see supra note 5), are available to hear the same claims that are presentable to
federal district courts. The presence of federal jurisdiction does not alter this system of
concurrent jurisdiction.
It is 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) that allows for removal from the jurisdictions of a state court
to the jurisdiction of a federal court. This removal extinguishes state court jurisdiction but
only over the particular case that is removed. It does not alter the "right" of the state courts
to hear claims of the type presented in the removed case.
If this concern that extinguishment of state court jurisdiction should be avoided is the
basis of Gully, it is faulty analysis indeed. In effect, the Court has interpreted the § 1331
"arising under" phrase for determining whether a case may have been brought originally in
federal district court, based on the extinguishment caused by its reference in the removal
provision of 28 U.S.C. § t441(b). To the contrary, removal is a right conditioned on federal
jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction should not be determined because removal has been
granted by Congress. The determination of federal jurisdiction under 28 US.C_ § 1331
should be made, even in a removal case, as if the right of removal did not exist. In other
words, the right of removal should not be determinative of the definition of original federal
question jurisdiction. Rather, the existence of original federal question jurisdiction is deter-
minative of the right of removal. Arguably, however, that is exactly what the Supreme Court
did in Gully. Furthermore, it has continued that approach in Franchise Tax Bd. See 463
U.S. at 13-14, 20-21.




emphasis on proper pleading.
Subsequent federal courts have relied on the latter ground to deny ju-
risdiction in declaratory judgment actions asserting federal preemption of
state law. The assumption has been that a defensive claim is plead im-
properly and cannot be the basis of federal jurisdiction. These courts
have erroneously assumed that the proper pleading approach in Gully in-
dicates that Gully was based on the "aggressor as master" rationale of the
well-pleaded complaint rule.
Although Gully did not involve the Declaratory Judgment Act, Justice
Cardozo saw the possibility that the plaintiff's cause of action could be
based on a federal immunity as well as a federal right. The Gully opinion
states that a federal right or immunity must be an essential element of
the asserted claim. 3 Nevertheless, subsequent cases have not distin-
guished a right from an immunity in this context.4 An immunity is de-
fensive by definition. One has an immunity from something in contrast to
having a right to something or to do something.
Prior to the adoption of the Declaratory Judgment Act, a plaintiff
could seek injunctive relief on the basis of a federal immunity against
threatened actions cognizable under state law."" Gully would not deny ju-
risdiction. The declaratory judgment device merely permits declaratory
relief before the occurrence of conduct justifying traditional injunctive
relief. 4
The rejection of a defensive claim is based on the "aggressor as master"
rationale.47 Gully should not be interpreted as being based on this ration-
ale of the well-pleaded complaint rule."' A party defending a claim may
assert that federal law preempts the state law relied on by the other dis-
putant. This defending party may be asserting a federal immunity from a
liability created by state law. If the state liability has been preempted by
federal law the claimed immunity may mean that the defending disputant
prevails. If the defending disputant files a declaratory judgment action
alleging the federal immunity and asserting that the dispute is controlled
by federal law, federal law is an essential ingredient of the case. Gully
would not require a holding to the contrary. Although it is relied on for
the proposition that a defense cannot be the basis of federal jurisdiction,
I d.
" The Second Circuit in Stone & Webster, 690 F.2d at 328, recognized this distinction.
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was enacted in 1934. JAMES & HAZARD, supra
note 5, at § 1.10.
11 See BORCHARD, supra note 33, at 25. Of course, to a certain extent declaratory relief
was available as an equitable remedy prior to the adoption of declaratory judgment statutes.
DoaBs, supra note 5, at 26. However, such relief was usually part of more coercive equitable
remedies. Id.
'7 See supra notes 21 and 22.
4 Professor Trautman has reduced the Gully analysis to five separate statements. See
Trautman, supra note 15, at 459. Two of the five deal with proper pleading; the other three
focus on the essence of the controversy. Id.
1984-85]
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
such reliance is misplaced. Actually, the essence of the Gully opinion is
that federal jurisdiction depends on whether the "essential nature" of the
dispute is federal. The proper-pleading language merely reflects the cur-
rent notions for determining jurisdiction from the initial pleading.49
Justice Cardozo explained that the right or immunity must be the heart
of the matter so that if given one construction it will be defeated and
given another, it will prevail.5 5 In the situation where federal law clearly
provides a duty other than the one relied on by the plaintiff, if federal
law controls, the federal immunity will prevail; if the federal law does not
control, the alleged federal immunity will fail. This is exactly what the
declaratory plaintiff is claiming.
On the other hand, applying federal law may not mean that the dispu-
tant asserting the federal immunity will prevail on the merits. Federal
law may allow for plaintiff's claim in the same manner as state law. How-
ever, that question, as well as the question of which party prevails, is
premature. These questions require an interpretation of the preeminent
federal law. Certainly Justice Cardozo was not suggesting that federal ju-
risdiction could be decided until the merits were determined."' The Gully
language merely means that based on the pleadings, federal law would be
the basis for determining the merits. At that stage, with one party assert-
ing state law and the other relying on federal law, the choice of law would
appear to be outcome-determinative.
5 2
See Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
5 299 U.S. at 112. This approach was similar to Chief Justice Marshall's explanation in
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
61 This suggestion is contrary to common law pleading requirements that dilatory pleas
and pleas in abatement be presented early in the proceeding. In fact, there is case authority
that the failure to object to jurisdiction by a plea in abatement constituted waiver. See
DOBBS, supra note 5, at 511-12. Professor Dobbs states that Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315
(1889), took the position in dictum that prior to the Judiciary Act of 1875 subject matter
jurisdiction could be waived. Id. In Morris, the Court stated that under the Judiciary Act of
1789 the issue of citizenship could only "be made by a plea in abatement, when the plead-
ings properly averred the citizenship of the parties." 129 U.S. at 326. The 1875 Act, how-
ever, imposed a duty upon the court to dismiss "if it appears at any time after it is brought
and before it is finally disposed of that it does not really and substantially involve a contro-
versy of which it [the court] may properly take cognizance." Id.
As discussed in supra note 20, there is a strong policy favoring the earliest possible deter-
mination of jurisdiction. This has been referred to as the first rule of jurisdiction.
5' This supposition depends on which party raises the issue. The point is that jurisdic-
tion cannot be made to depend on which party may prevail on the merits. A determination
of which party should prevail on the preemption question may be relevant. Certainly, a
frivolous assertion that federal law has preempted state law would not be sufficient for ju-
risdictional purposes just as frivolous assertion of a federal claim would not be sufficient.
See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962); Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport,
195 U.S. 561, 579 (1904). The "substantial federal question" doctrine has not gone unques-
tioned. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 683 (1946); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404
(1970). Nevertheless, an assertion of preemption "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed




There is another reason why Gully should not be used to reject federal
question jurisdiction where federal preemption is asserted defensively by
a declaratory plaintiff. As indicated, it is the proper pleading aspect of
Gully that has resulted in the denial of jurisdiction. However, the Gully
pleading pronouncements were made in the context of discovering
whether the claimant asserted a right which was federal or state in na-
ture. Gully refined the Holmes' "creation" test, preferring to determine
jurisdiction by discovering the "essential nature" of the claim rather than
by what source created the claim.53 Gully did not attempt to consider
whether a claim created by state law could, nevertheless, be within the
original jurisdiction of the federal district courts.
The primary function of the well-pleaded complaint rule has been to
limit the number of state law claims that a federal district court may hear
in non-diversity cases.5 4 Proper pleading rules are the vehicle used to de-
termine whether the federal issue is at the forefront of the case, or
whether the right to relief requires a construction of federal law. Gully
did not attempt to make such a determination. It did not apply the well-
pleaded complaint rule to determine whether the state-created right to
relief required a construction of the federal issue. In Gully, Justice Car-
dozo used proper pleading rules to restrict the inquiry into the "essential
nature" of the plaintiff's cause of action, so that it could be characterized
as a creature either of state or federal law.5  Even if one accepts, for
purposes of argument, that the underlying claim is a creature of state law
and not a federal defensive claim, the Gully tests would not apply to the
further inquiry about the need to construe federal law. Gully did not ad-
dress the issue that the Supreme Court recognized in Kansas City Title
& Trust Co. If the plaintiffs claim is state created but the granting of
declaratory relief necessitates construing whether federal law provides
plaintiff with immunity, there is no need to determine the essential na-
ture of the claim. Rather, the judicial inquiry is whether the interpreta-
tion of federal law is essential to granting the relief requested, despite it
being essentially a state claim. Therefore, the Gully pleading require-
ments should not be used to restrict a defensive assertion of the federal
immunity issue.
It is Skelly Oil"6 that applied the well-pleaded complaint rule to the
declaratory judgment situation. Justice Frankfurter was concerned that
allowing federal jurisdiction on the basis of an anticipated defense de-
rived from federal law would "unduly swell the volume of litigation" in
the federal courts.5 7 He saw the declaratory judgment action asserting a
sufficient. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974).
53 299 U.S. at 112.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
' 299 U.S. at 113.
339 U.S. 667 (1950).
" Id. at 673. This speculation concerning the effect on the court docket helped to make
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defense based on federal law as allowing "artful pleading" to control fed-
eral court jurisdiction. 8 The pleading was termed "artful" because it con-
tradicted the "aggressor as master" rationale of the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule. In fact, the "defending" declaratory plaintiff does not
manufacture a federal right based on artful pleading; he pleads as permit-
the well-pleaded complaint rule an amorphous definition of the outer limits of statutory
federal question jurisdiction. The declaratory remedy certainly permitted actions that could
not have been brought previously. See supra note 46. However, the declaratory remedy may
have short-circuited more extensive litigation involving complicated damage or equitable
issues. Although the number of cases may have increased, the total court time may have
been reduced. On the other hand, declaratory plaintiffs often seek a coercive remedy in
addition to demanding a declaratory judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 57.
The central point, however, is that federal question jurisdiction should not be a function
of ad hoc judicial speculations as to future court congestion. To the extent that courts are
true to the "arising under" requirement, congressional actions regulate the volume of federal
court litigation. The court's function is to handle litigation in an expeditious manner. The
use of a discretionary doctrine to limit access to the court system results in the consumption
of more court time on that procedural issue.
58 339 U.S. at 673-74. Of course, the argument has been made that Skelly Oil really did
not present a difficult case. In fact, that case involved a contract dispute in which the al-
leged breach was the Federal Power Commission's conditional issuance of a certificate of
public convenience and necessity for the construction and operation of a pipeline. The con-
tract for the sale of gas allowed the sellers to terminate if the certificate was not issued. The
right to terminate was dependent upon whether the conditional issuance constituted a fail-
ure to secure the certificate within the meaning of the contract. The pipeline company and
Phillips brought their civil action seeking a declaration that the certificate had been issued
within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act and the contracts prior to the attempted
termination.
The underlying dispute was based on the contract. The right being asserted was based on
the contract. Federal law was involved only because it was referred to in the contract. The
case was an easy one under American Well Works, 241 U.S. 257 (1916). The claim was a
creature of the contract between the parties. The claim was not a creature of the Natural
Gas Act.
Such an approach, however, assumes that the "creation" test is an exclusive test. In fact,
the Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust doctrine co-exists with it. The well-pleaded com-
plaint rule functions most often in the Smith type of case. Therefore, Justice Frankfurter,
referred to as "the most ardent proponent" of the Holmes' "creation" test, Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. at 9, was undoubtedly concerned about whether the Federal Declaratory Judg-
ment Act "created" a new cause of action. If the Act created a federal cause of action,
federal jurisdiction would be available. Also, the Act would have extended federal question
jurisdiction beyond the previous confines of a well-pleaded complaint for coercive relief.
Thus, the Skelly Oil Court looked at the underlying dispute as if the action had been for
coercive relief. In that manner, it concluded that the "essence" of the claim was rooted in
state law. Phillips Petroleum's assertion that a certificate had issued "within the meaning of
said Natural Gas Act," 339 U.S. at 667, would have been "injected into the case only in
anticipation of a defense .... " Id.
The well-pleaded complaint rule would not permit the assertion of federal jurisdiction
merely because "an anticipated defense derived from federal law." Id. Therefore, proper
pleading under the Declaratory Judgment Act did not constitute the pleading of a federally-
created cause of action and did not convert a federal defense into an essential element of a




ted by the declaratory judgment device and Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 8(a).6 9
Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter used the Skelly Oil case to "clarify"
the view that the Declaratory Judgment Act was procedural only and did
not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts. He carefully defined ju-
risdiction to refer to "the kinds of issues which give right of entrance to
federal courts."60 This definition was intended to distinguish it from ju-
risdiction to grant certain types of relief or remedies. The Court held that
the declaratory judgment device could not change the nature of the claim
merely because the allegations upon which it is based artfully plead a
defense derived from federal law.
Chief Justice Vinson, joined by Justice Burton, dissenting, doubted
that there was "a federal question here at all."6 The declaratory plain-
tiffs in Skelly Oil were attempting to have a federal court decide whether
the conditional issuance of a Federal Power Commission certificate con-
stituted "issuance" sufficient to eliminate the right to terminate the con-
tract. That question depended on whether the FPC issued the certificate
within the meaning of the contract between the parties and not necessa-
rily on whether the document was issued as a matter of federal law.
The majority, however, discovered a federal question, but based the de-
nial of jurisdiction on the "aggressor as master" rationale of the well-
pleaded complaint rule, distinguishing between a federal claim and a fed-
eral defense. Pleading a declaratory judgment action defensively was con-
sidered artfully attempting to gain federal jurisdiction. Pleading a declar-
atory action defensively was an attempt to expand federal court
jurisdiction to cover allegations traditionally not cognizable in the com-
plaint. This artful pleading language in Skelly Oil has resulted in denial
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .... Obviously, declaratory relief
may be all that the pleader desires.
'o 339 U.S. at 671 (1950).
." Id. at 679. The Skelly Oil situation is one step further from federal jurisdiction than
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205 (1934), where state law had referenced federal
safety standards. In Skelly Oil, private parties referenced a federal certificate in the con-
tract as an event pivotal to performance. In neither situation does the federal law have
"force proprio vigore." See Smith, 255 U.S. at 215 (1921)(Holmes, J., dissenting).
Skelly Oil is relied upon for determining subject matter jurisdiction based on the more
aggressive disputant's hypothetical complaint for coercive relief. If the threatening aggres-
sive disputant had won the race to the courthouse, the court would have had to determine
whether he would have asserted a state or a federal claim. See La Chemise Lacoste v. Alliga-
tor Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 339, 345-46 (3d Cir. 1974), where the court attempted to apply this
approach. Of course, Skelly Oil did not recommend this approach specifically. See Horn-
stein, supra note 14, at 602-03 n. 218, 608 n. 237. Skelly Oil only rejected jurisdiction. Actu-
ally, it is Wycoff which recommended this approach. See supra note 22. Thus, Wycoff effec-
tively expanded the jurisdictional inquiry from the actual complaint to the aggressive
disputant's cause of action where Skelly Oil would simply reject jurisdiction.
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of federal jurisdiction in the federal preemption situation."
Judicial decisions treat Skelly Oil as a logical extension of Gully. Unde-
niably, Gully directed the jurisdictional inquiry to the plaintiff's com-
plaint as had Mottley before it.63 However, Gully expressly permitted the
claim to be based on a federal immunity. The important factor in those
cases was that the federal immunity be the essence of the plaintiffs
claim; that it not be incidental. Yet, the Supreme Court in Skelly Oil, in
its eagerness to end any hint that the Declaratory Judgment Act had ex-
panded the jurisdiction of the federal courts, misapplied the well-pleaded
complaint rule and made a federal claim/federal defense distinction not
required by Gully. The jurisdictional issue now turned on whether the
declaratory complaint was aggressive or non-aggressive. Gully was not
needed to reach that conclusion, but merely used to substantiate the view
that federal jurisdiction was not available in every action that involved
federal questions."" Moreover, the Skelly Oil Court interpreted the "ag-
gressor as master" rationale of the well-pleaded complaint rule as defin-
ing the inflexible outer limits of statutory "arising under" jurisdiction. A
change in procedural law allowing judicial relief to the "non-aggressor"
did not change the jurisdictional boundary line. Unless the federal issue
was pleaded aggressively as determined prior to the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act, it was an unwanted trespasser.
The Court failed to recognize that the well-pleaded complaint rule was
a vehicle for determining the nature of the claim. Since defensive allega-
tions were proper to obtain declaratory relief, they should not be off lim-
its to the jurisdictional inquiry.6 5
Two years after Skelly Oil, the Supreme Court further muddied the
jurisdictional waters in Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., Inc.66
The Wycoff Company sought declaratory relief alleging that the Utah
commission was interfering with the conduct of interstate commerce and
imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court
held that the dispute had not matured to the point of a concrete contro-
versy. At the end of the opinion, Justice Jackson discussed, obiter dic-
tum, federal question jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions. He
stated that many declaratory judgment actions reverse the realistic posi-
tions of the parties: the defending party is declaratory plaintiff and the
aggressive party is declaratory defendant.6 7 To maintain the rationale
that the "aggressor" should control the choice of forum, Justice Jackson
explained that federal question jurisdiction should be based on the nature
62 For example, both Alton Box and First Federal refer to this "artful pleading" con-
cept. See supra note 9.
"' See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
" 339 U.S. at 672.
"' See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
344 U.S. 237 (1952). See supra note 22.




of the threatened action and not the defense asserted by the declaratory
plaintiff. If the claim threatened by the declaratory defendant does not
involve a claim under federal law, "it is doubtful if a federal court may
entertain an action for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense to
that claim.""8
Although Skelly Oil had rejected jurisdiction where the declaratory
plaintiff's claim was defensive, the Court had not explained its reasoning
in terms of the "aggressor as master" rationale. Justice Jackson clarified
this point in Wycoff, which extended the jurisdictional inquiry by shifting
it from the defensive declaratory claim to the nature of the claim
threatened by the actual aggressive disputant. Since Wycoff Company's
declaratory complaint was assumed to be asserting a federal defense, fed-
eral jurisdiction was doubtful. Because the declaratory plaintiff is not the
aggressor, it could not control jurisdiction; the aggressor's claim con-
trolled the jurisdictional issue."9
Justice Jackson's doubt remained even if the declaratory complaint as-
serted "a claim of federal right, if that right is in reality in the nature of a
defense to a threatened cause of action."10 Thus, Wycoff altered the judi-
cial search in Gully to focus on the true nature of the asserted right. Not
only must the court look for a federal right, it must also assess whether
that right is "in the nature of a defense." The right's posture as defensive
or offensive has become more important than its nature as federal or
state.
As in Skelly Oil, the Wycoff majority was troubled by the apparent fact
that a declaratory judgment action may allow for federal jurisdiction
where it would not otherwise exist. Its dictum compounded the error of
Skelly Oil regarding the function of the well-pleaded complaint rule. The
well-pleaded complaint rule was not viewed as a test for determining ju-
risdiction which should be reassessed in light of modifications to the rules
of pleading. Instead, it was regarded as a rule setting the outer limits of
federal jurisdiction2' Thus, the Wycoff dictum has been a basis for refus-
63 Id.
69 The notion that the plaintiff is the master of his claim and therefore should control
the selection of the forum was altered to conform with the declaratory judgment remedy.
The aggressive disputant, although not the declaratory plaintiff, is the new captain of the
litigation ship. See supra note 22.
" 344 U.S. at 248.
" The Supreme Court, in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), ruled that
the Declaratory Judgment Act was "procedural only." It did not enlarge the scope of judi-
cial power granted by the Constitution to the federal courts, see Trautman, supra note 15,
at 464. The problem with this analysis is the hazy boundary that constitutes the existing
scope of federal jurisdiction. Common law pleading rules had been applied under the well-
pleaded complaint rule as a technique for determining the true nature of the action. See
Haworth, 300 U.S. at 244. They did not establish a constitutional scope of federal jurisdic-
tion. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), Chief Justice
Marshall established the constitutional scope of federal jurisdiction with the "federal ingre-
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ing federal jurisdiction in cases where a declaratory plaintiff asserts fed-
eral preemption as a basis for jurisdiction. The assumption is that to do
otherwise would allow the declaratory judgment device to expand federal
jurisdiction.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Wycoff, addressed the jurisdictional issue
as well as the justiciability question. He viewed the Utah commission's
action as an attempt to stop Wycoff from conducting interstate com-
merce. "That is an attempt to regulate in a field pre-empted by the Con-
gress under the Motor Carrier Act."'7 2 This fact alone was sufficient to
make this a case "arising under" the laws of the United States within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The dissent recognized that, as a matter of
policy, federal jurisdiction should be exercised to protect the federal
right . 3 The defensive or offensive posture of the issue should not be
determinative.
The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes the plaintiff to present a de-
fensive claim or immunity for resolution by a federal court."' The dissent
in Wycoff correctly considered the declaratory complaint to be asserting
rights in an area preempted by Congress. It considered this fact sufficient
for jurisdiction. Certainly, to the extent the Wycoff Company had a claim
dient" test. In fact, the well-pleaded complaint rule is not applicable to the article III in-
quiry. Verlinden, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). However, Justice Frankfurter in Skelly Oil not only
reverted to the pleading rules but erroneously treated them as defining the outer limits of
federal jurisdiction. See Trautman, supra note 15, at 465-66. A major premise in Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Skelly Oil was that the declaratory judgment device would cause a
flood of litigation in the federal courts. 339 U.S. at 673. See supra note 57.
71 344 U.S. at 252 (Douglas, J., dissenting)(citations omitted). In Thurston Motor Lines,
Inc. v. Jordon K. Rand, LTD., 460 U.S. 533 (1983), the Supreme Court recently found fed-
eral question jurisdiction in an action brought by a common carrier seeking to recover
freight charges for an interstate shipment regulated by the Interstate Commerce Act (59
U.S.C. § 10741(a)). The Court did not say specifically that Congress had preempted state
regulation, as the dissent argued in Wycoff. Rather, it stated that the carrier's claim is "of
necessity, predicated on the tariff ...." 460 U.S. at 533. This "necessity" exists since fed-
eral law preempted the carrier's state law claim.
The Ninth Circuit had rejected jurisdiction since the shipping contract was regulated by
state law and the tariff rate would be a defense to any attempt to collect a larger amount.
See 682 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "it is the char-
acter of the action and not the defense which determines whether there is federal question
jurisdiction." 406 U.S. at 535. The Court relied on Wycoff and Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125 (1974). Although the Supreme Court did not hold that federal law
preempted state law, it determined that the character of the action was federal because
federal law controlled the claim. Unfortunately, the Court continued to dilute a coherent
jurisdictional analysis based on what law governs the dispute with reliance on whether that
law is raised defensively or offensively as a matter of pleading. As a result, the opinion
provides little guidance to the analysis of the federal question jurisdiction in the preemption
context. The Court appears not to notice the confusion in the lower courts.
11 344 U.S. at 253. Such a policy is consistent with the concept of protective jurisdiction
espoused by Professor Mishkin. See supra note 5. However, it is not the reason that federal
jurisdiction exists.




for declaratory relief, it was based on a federal immunity. It plead its
claim in terms of undue burden on interstate commerce under the Com-
merce Clause. Federal preemption of the area provided it with an oppor-
tunity to have immunity from conflicting state regulation. Under Gully,
federal jurisdiction should be proper in that situation. If the district court
determined that Congress had preempted the area, as the dissent argues,
the Wycoff Company would prevail because Utah would not have the
power to regulate. If the district court did not find preemption, then
Utah would prevail if the regulation did not otherwise violate the Com-
merce Clause. This is precisely the type of situation where application of
the Gully tests means that federal immunity is the essence of the case."
The legacy of Gully, Skelly Oil and Wycoff is the dominance of the
"aggressor as master" rationale of the well-pleaded complaint rule. The
impact of these cases is greatest in declaratory judgment actions and re-
movals based on federal question jurisdiction. In both instances the ag-
gressor's choice of forum has not controlled. In the former, the non-ag-
gressor has won the race to the courthouse by filing an action for
declaratory relief; in the latter, the non-aggressor, as the defendant, has
removed the action from state to federal court. However, the federal
courts have not allowed these devices to alter the "aggressor as master"
approach. In both instances, the jurisdictional inquiry is limited to the
aggressor's initial pleading or potential pleading.
This reliance on the "aggressor as master" rationale reflects an outmo-
ded view of litigation. It is a "trial by combat" approach. It conflicts with
current notions that judicial determination is merely one tier in a dispute
resolution system. A dispute is a continuum. Judicial action should mean
that other resolution techniques have been exhausted without success. In
the face of ever-increasing caseloads, court rhetoric supports dispute reso-
lution by means short of litigation. Nevertheless, the federal courts, fol-
lowing the lead of the Supreme Court, have endorsed jurisdictional doc-
trine which favors the disputant who initiates judicial action. Conversely,
the disputant who initiates the last tier should not receive favored treat-
ment. This initiator should not be able to control the choice of forum
where significant legal issues are involved. Litigation should not be
viewed as a forum where the offended pugilist chooses the method of
combat. Yet, this is precisely the rationale supporting the Court's juris-
dictional doctrine.
C. Federal Declaratory Judgments: Recent Application of
Jurisdictional Doctrine
Many original federal court actions asserting preemption have been for
declaratory relief. If the declaratory plaintiff seeks a decree in federal
"' See supra note 52 for a discussion on this point.
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court that a particular federal law preempts the state law relied upon by
the declaratory defendant, federal jurisdiction will be denied. The well-
pleaded complaint rule prevents such a defense from being the basis for
federal question jurisdiction."5
However, there are two types of declaratory actions where federal juris-
diction has been sustained. If the declaratory plaintiff also seeks injunc-
tive or other coercive relief, the federal courts will accept jurisdiction."
Also, if the plaintiff is subject to conflicting state and federal regulations
so that an action for injunctive relief could have been brought, federal
jurisdiction exists.7" In both of these situations the courts avoid the con-
fines of the Wycoff "aggressor as master" rationale by classifying the de-
claratory plaintiff as the aggressor. The coercive relief demanded, or po-
tentially demanded, is the basis for this classification.
Recent circuit court decisions illustrate these differing approaches. The
first type of case which is controlled by Skelly Oil and the Wycoff dictum
may be exemplified by City National Bank v. Edmisten,9 Michigan Sav-
ings & Loan League v. Francis,80 and First Federal Savings & Loan v.
Detroit Bond.a1 In Edmisten, the declaratory plaintiffs were banks seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that an annual membership fee for bank
credit card holders would not violate state usury laws. In Francis, the
plaintiffs were a group of federally chartered savings and loan associa-
tions seeking a declaratory judgment that they were exempt from a state
anti-redlining statute. In Detroit Bond, the plaintiffs were federal savings
and loan associations seeking a declaratory judgment that they were ex-
empt from state limitations on the enforcement of mortgage due-on-sale
clauses. In each case, the essence of the declaration sought was that fed-
eral law preempted the state law asserted by the declaratory defendant.
All three courts applied the well-pleaded complaint rule under the "ag-
gressor as master" rationale explained in Wycoff. They stated that the
plaintiff was "seeking a declaration that it has a good defense to a
7" See supra note 9; First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Detroit Bond & Mortgage Inv. Co.
687 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1982); Lawrence County v. State of South Dakota, 668 F.2d 27 (8th
Cir. 1982); Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1982).
77 See, e.g., Stone & Webster, 690 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1982).
" Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd
mem. 445 U.S. 921 (1980); First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1st Cir.
1979); Braniff Int'l, Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1978).
The Supreme Court formally endorsed this view in Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 20
n.20, on the theory that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not extend federal court jurisdic-
tion because the court would have had jurisdiction over the cases as actions for injunctive
relief. In effect, the declaratory plaintiff can be characterized as an aggressor.
This separate doctrine distinguishes the scope of jurisdiction in original actions from that
in the removal situation. See Greenwald, 591 F.2d at 423 n. 8.
79 681 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1982).
- 683 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1982).




threatened action .... "I Federal preemption was viewed as a defense
"to fend off anticipated state law challenges ...."83 The result in each
case was a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 4
It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs in these three declaratory
judgment actions did not appreciate the effect of their demand for relief
on the jurisdictional issue. If they had demanded injunctive relief or other
coercive relief in addition to declaratory relief, jurisdiction may have been
sustained under the exceptions noted above. 5 In fact, in Edmisten, the
plaintiffs originally sought injunctive relief but dropped this request in an
amended complaint." This is not surprising in light of the maze of cur-
rent jurisdictional doctrine.
An example of federal question jurisdiction demanding additional coer-
cive relief is Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. Ilsley,"7 decided by
Second Circuit. Stone & Webster, an employer, brought an action for a
declaratory judgment stating that the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 preempted a state statute requiring an employer to
provide insurance benefits for a former employee receiving workers' com-
pensation. The district court found jurisdiction and granted summary
judgment for the employer. On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the
jurisdictional issue.
Although the Second Circuit noted that federal question jurisdiction
could be based on a declaratory action asserting a federal immunity, its
decision was based on a different ground.88 Rather, the court found the
"historical test in Mottley" satisfied due to the presence of a claim for
injunctive relief.8 9 The plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, in addition
to declaratory relief, enabled the court to classify the plaintiff as an ag-
gressor. Since the declaratory claim was not defensive, the assertion of
federal preemption supported jurisdiction. The Wycoff dictum, which
shifted the jurisdictional inquiry to the nature of the declaratory defen-
Edmisten, 681 F.2d at 945.
Detroit Bond, 687 F.2d at 144.
" Edmisten, 681 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1982), provides an excellent example of the applica-
tion of the Wycoff doctrine basing jurisdiction on the character of the true aggressor's
threatened action. The court stated: "If the Attorney General of North Carolina had
threatened action under § 86 [federal law] ..., this declaratory judgment action would...
arise under federal law. But the Attorney General has threatened to charge plaintiffs with a
violation of state usury laws .... Therefore, § 86 . . .does not provide a basis for federal
jurisdiction." Id. at 946.
The court did not discuss how it determined the nature of the threatened action. Presum-
ably, the state attorney general could have threatened application of federal law as well as
state law.
1* See supra notes 77 and 78.
88 681 F.2d at 944 n. 3.
87 690 F.2d 323 (1982).
88 Id. at 328.
Id. at 327.
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dant's claim, was inapplicable.90
A demand for injunctive relief is the other area where jurisdiction has
been sustained for a declaratory judgment action asserting federal pre-
emption. This type of case is also distinguishable from the Wycoff dic-
tum. Wycoff and Skelly Oil generally apply to a non-aggressor's action
for declaratory judgment. If the declaratory plaintiff would have brought
an action for injunctive relief, the federal court would have had jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, accepting jurisdiction over the action for declaratory re-
lief is not an expansion of federal jurisdiction as it existed prior to the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.
This exception to Wycoff and Skelly Oil is often stated in justiciability
terms. This is unnecessarily confusing and may very well camouflage the
jurisdictional doctrine.
Conference of Federal Savings & Loan Associations v. Stein"' is an
example of this doctrine. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Wycoff on the
following basis:
There, the majority concluded that there was no proof of any
threatened or probable act by the state commission which might
cause the irreparable injury essential to equitable relief or which
could serve to create the actual controversy necessary for declara-
tory judgment jurisdiction. Here, an actual conflict exists created
by the conflicting positions taken by appellant and the Bank
Board.
9 2
Thus, the Wycoff dictum only applies when the declaratory plaintiff
could not have otherwise obtained federal jurisdiction by seeking more
coercive relief. An actual conflict in substantive law requirements, with
90 In the district court, the State of Connecticut had argued that Stone & Webster did
not have standing to institute the action under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1982). Stone
& Webster argued that even where the preemptive federal law provides no right to relief,
the doctrine of preemption nevertheless provides "arising under" jurisdiction. The district
court accepted that argument. The Second Circuit stated that Stone & Webster had stand-
ing because it was "an employer whose interests were considered and protected by Con-
gress" and was "directly affected by the Connecticut statute .... " 690 F.2d at 326. Thus,
the fact that ERISA did not grant the employer a right to relief did not mean it lacked
standing.
In Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1, (1983), the Supreme Court took a different approach in
considering removal jurisdiction. The Court used the lack of relief in ERISA as a basis for
rejecting jurisdiction. Whether the Supreme Court's use of a standing analysis in that con-
text negates the Second Circuit's conclusion is unclear. The better reasoning is that the lack
of a provision for relief in the federal statute merely means that federal jurisdiction cannot
be based on that section of federal law. It should not be determinative of whether the case
"arises under" federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court in Franchise Tax Bd. uses the absence of an explicit federal cause of action to
substantiate its decision to reject removal jurisdiction. 463 U.S. at 24-26.
' 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd mem. 445 U.S. 921 (1980).




threatened enforcement and irreparable harm, provides federal jurisdic-
tion over the declaratory judgment action. The declaratory plaintiff is le-
gitimately an aggressor with the corresponding right to be master of the
forum.
The Supreme Court affirmed Stein without addressing the jurisdic-
tional question." However, in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction La-
borers Vacation Trust,94 the Court acknowledged this separate doctrine
as an exception to Wycoff and Skelly Oil. The cases establishing this doc-
trine are Lake Carriers Association v. MacMullan,95 Rath Packing Co. v.
Becker,96 and First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Greenwald.
9 7
Each court found federal jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action
which asserted federal preemption from the existence of a justiciable con-
troversy due to conflicting state and federal regulatory requirements. The
approach limits Wycoff and Skelly Oil to a declaratory judgment action
which would not be "justiciable" for equitable relief. As stated in Green-
wald, "[t]he matter of preemption and related federal issues were the fo-
cal point of the declaratory judgment suit, hence federal question juris-
diction existed in that case under any analysis."98 The existence of an
actual conflict between the state and federal regulations is sufficient for
injunctive relief to be granted.9 9 Accordingly, the constraints of Wycoff
are avoided.
The line between the Greenwald cases and the cases covered by Wycoff
is not often recognized. 00 Furthermore, even when both injunctive relief
and declaratory relief are requested, the courts and the parties fail to rec-
ognize that Wycoff is not applicable. Stone & Webster is the exceptional
case that acknowledges the "aggressor as master" rationale as the basis of
Wycoff.
In Alton Box Board Co. v. Esprit De Corp,'10 manufacturers of corru-
gated containers filed an action seeking both an injunction precluding the
prosecution of a state court action and a declaratory judgment that the
93 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
" 463 U.S. at 20, n. 20.
" 406 U.S. 498, 506-08 (1972).
"0 530 F.2d 1295, 1303-06 (9th Cir. 1975), af'd sub nom. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519 (1977).
" 591 F.2d 417 (lst Cir. 1979).
9 Id. at 423.
Id. at 423 n. 8.
100 The court, in finding federal jurisdiction, may be suggesting that the declaratory claim
has "independent viability." See Note, The Expanded Federal Question: On the "Indepen-
dent Viability" of Declaratory Claims, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 809, 817 (1982). However, it is
important to understand that this "viability" is based on the court's conclusion that coer-
cive equitable relief could have been sought. Thus, it is not the declaratory claim itself but
the court's assessment of the nature of the threatened activity that provides for federal
jurisdiction.
101 682 F. 2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982).
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state court action was preempted by federal law. Since the state court
action was already in process the demand implicated the Anti-Injunction
Act.'0 2 However, the circuit court also addressed the issue of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction. It rejected jurisdiction on the basis of Wycoff and SkeUy
Oil, stating: "A claim does not arise under federal law within the mean-
ing of section 1331 to establish an immunity or defense which would pre-
clude the declaratory judgment defendant from successfully litigating




The Alton Box court, however, recognized the Stein exception to
Wycoff. It found that exception inapplicable because there was no "actual
conflict" in substantive law requirements. 04 In other words, the dispute
was not justiciable for injunctive relief.
First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Anderson"5 involved two
similar actions concerning declaratory relief and coercive relief. The
plaintiffs, federally chartered savings and loan associations, sought fore-
closure of a mortgage for violation of a due-on-sale clause. The plaintiffs
amended their complaint and also sought a declaratory judgment that
federal law preempts state law regarding due-on-sale clauses. In the sec-
ond action, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that federal law
"exclusively governs" its mortgage acceleration clauses, and also sought to
initiate foreclosure. 06 In both cases, the coercive relief of foreclosure was
undoubtedly the primary relief requested although it depended on a find-
ing of preemption. This finding does not necessarily result in a declara-
tory judgment. 10 7
Despite the requests for coercive relief, the Eighth Circuit in Anderson
did not discuss the exceptions to Wycoff. It found Wycoff controlling and
the "assertion of federal preemption as a defense to a state law claim
"'108
One may argue that the Greenwald line of cases did not apply in An-
derson because there was no conflict between federal and state substan-
tive law requirements. However, the Supreme Court later held that there
was such a conflict.'09 In any event, the Anderson court was aware of
Stein but did not recognize it as representative of a separate jurisdic-
1 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948). This prohibition was first enacted in 1793, 1 Stat. 335. See
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
... 682 F.2d at 1274.
,o' Id. at n. 11. The court saw Rath Packing and Stein as a possible exception to the
Wycoff rule. Id.
105 681 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 531.
lo The court could conclude as a matter of law that federal law preempted state law, and
base the foreclosure on the preemptive federal law. FED R. Civ. P. 52.
,08 681 F.2d at 533.




tional doctrine and as an exception to Wycoff." 0 The justiciability lan-
guage effectively disguises the jurisdictional nature of this line of cases."'
The request for foreclosure in Anderson should have brought it within
this exception to Wycoff.
The camouflage of justiciability is exemplified in Michigan Savings &
Loan League v. Francis"2 in which the Sixth Circuit rejected federal pre-
emption as a ground for federal question jurisdiction in a declaratory
judgment action brought to void a state anti-redlining law. Chief Judge
Edwards dissented on the basis of Stein."' The dissent did not elaborate
except to note that Stein was quite "similar to our instant appeal.""
' 4
The majority, however, dealt with Stein by asserting that reliance on that
case to support jurisdiction "reflects either a misreading of Stein or a
lack of appreciation of the holding in Wycoff. 115
The court noted that Stein referred to Wycoff in terms of justiciability
of declaratory judgment actions. In a curious footnote, it quoted from
Wycoff the important conclusion that since the action could not be "en-
tertained as one for injunction. . . [it] should not be continued as one for
a declaratory judgment."" 6 Therefore, the court viewed Stein as "proce-
durally inapplicable" because "[jiusticiability presupposes subject matter
jurisdiction."' 17
The majority did not view Stein as representative of a separate Su-
preme Court jurisdictional doctrine. It did not understand that a finding
of justiciability in this context signalled a threat of irreparable harm suf-
ficient for equitable relief. Such justiciability meant that the case would
be within the jurisdiction of the federal district courts without regard to
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. Justiciability, in the sense of a
controversy cognizable in equity, does not presuppose jurisdiction but in-
dicates that the availability of declaratory relief did not bring a case
before the court which it otherwise could not have entertained."
8
The requisite threat of irreparable harm is linked to an "actual con-
flict" between the state and federal regulations, and impending enforce-
ment. As the Tenth Circuit has noted, the Stein and Greenwald cases
apply "where state regulations directly conflict with federal regulations
681 F.2d at 534 n. 9.
.. Id. The court noted that parenthetically Stein "concerns analogous federal regulation
and although the court labels the issue as 'federal question' jurisdiction, it analyzes the issue
as a problem of justiciability .... " Id.
"' 683 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1982).
"' Id. at 962-63 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
114 Id.
"' Id. at 961.
Id. at 962 n. 10.
" Id. at 962.
See Wycoff, 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
" Madsen v.Prudential Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797, 804 (10th Cir. 1980).
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Nevertheless, it is not difficult to understand how justiciability consid-
erations hide the jurisdictional doctrine. Justiciability denotes a contro-
versy that is real, and not concocted to obtain an advisory opinion.' The
Declaratory Judgment Act requires such a "case or controversy," as does
article III of the Constitution. 2 ' However, the Supreme Court in Skelly
Oil and Wycoff related justiciability to the relief sought. In other words,
there was an actual controversy if equitable relief was sought. The equita-
ble language appears because there could be an actual dispute warranting
equitable relief against threatened acts even before damages were in-
flicted. If a dispute cognizable under the Declaratory Judgment Act could
be heard without a threat of irreparable harm, the Act would have ex-
panded the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Of course, the error of Skelly Oil and Wycoff is that justiciability
should not be determined by any specific type of relief that may be avail-
able. Justiciability is a constitutional concept requiring an actual dispute
between the parties that a court may resolve. Changing the nature of the
relief available does not change the subject matter jurisdiction require-
ment that the dispute "arise under" federal law. Just as the boundaries of
federal question jurisdiction were not surveyed by the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule, they were also not defined by the relief available at any par-
ticular point in time to remedy an actual dispute. 2 '
Nevertheless, federal declaratory judgment actions asserting federal
preemption may or may not be within federal court jurisdiction. Wycoff
and Skelly Oil are not immutable. Where the declaratory plaintiff also
seeks injunctive relief, he may be classified as an aggressor and escape the
confines of Wycoff. If the declaratory plaintiff can show the probability
of irreparable harm, he may be classified as an aggressor because he could
have obtained injunctive relief. This is the existing jurisdictional doctrine
in declaratory judgment actions asserting federal preemption.
An action for declaratory relief alone is treated as if it does not present
a justiciable controversy. Of course, there must be a justiciable contro-
versy before the court can grant a declaratory judgment. 23 However, fol-
lowing Wycoff and Skelly Oil, the federal courts have interpreted jus-
ticiability as meaning what it did prior to the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act. These decisions have enabled some federal declaratory ac-
tions asserting federal preemption to escape the Skelly Oil and Wycoff
jurisdictional limits on declaratory judgment actions.
Unfortunately, there has not been a move to reject Skelly Oil and
Haworth, 300 U.S. at 242. But see dictum of Justice Brandeis in Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274, 289 (1928), linking justiciability to the pursuit of coercive
relief.
"' The Declaratory Judgment Act specifically limits the relief to "a case of actual contro-
versy," 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
"z See supra note 120.




Wycoff as unnecessarily complicating the jurisdictional issue. Certainly
where federal preemption of state substantive law is asserted, the case
should "arise under" the source of that governing substantive law. The
present approach unnecessarily complicates this threshold inquiry, mak-
ing it unpredictable. The decision for practitioners is an impossible one.
Furthermore, as practitioners understand these doctrines, it will negate
the utility of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. Requesting such re-
lief only means a jurisdictional problem.
In the face of awkward and illogical results, there are few reasons to
support the existing doctrine. Jurisdiction of the federal district courts
should not be based on how the so-called "aggressor" describes the case
in its pleading.
2 4
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND REMOVAL JURISDICTION
A. Introduction
As with declaratory judgment actions, a variety of situations exist, each
having different jurisdictional results when the federal courts decide
whether removal from state court to federal court is proper. A defendant
may remove an action from state court to federal district court if the ac-
tion could have been brought originally in federal court.' Thus, removal
jurisdiction is linked to original "arising under" jurisdiction under
§ 1331.
In the removal cases, as with declaratory actions, federal question juris-
diction has been denied because the assertion of federal preemption was
made by the defendant and not the plaintiff. 2 ' In other words, the fed-
eral question must be an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion. On the other hand, jurisdiction has been sustained where federal law
has preempted the state cause of action."17 This type of preemption is
distinguishable from the preemption of the controlling substantive law." 8
"I The Supreme Court takes the position that this type of analysis is too well established
to be discarded, even with its obvious infirmities. Cf. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
Chief Justice Burger's plea for help with congested dockets at the Supreme Court level is
applicable here: "We can no longer tolerate the vacuous notion that we can get along with
the present structure [doctrine] because we have always done it that way." Burger, Annual
Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A.J. 442, 445 (1983).
126 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1982).
... Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Esprit De Corps, 682 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982); Illinois v. Kerr-
McGee Chem. Corp, 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1049 (1982); First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1982); City Nat'l Bank v. Edmis-
ten, 681 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1982).
' Lafferty v. Solar Turbines Int'l, 666 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1982); Fristoe v. Reynolds Met-
als Co., 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists, 376 F.2d 337, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
"0 Federal law may preempt the rules of decision and govern liability between the parties
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Federal jurisdiction also has been sustained where the alleged state claim
is actually a federal claim.1"9
A separate category of cases involves the removal of state declaratory
judgment actions asserting federal preemption of state law. The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Franchise Tax Board dealt with this type of
situation. A critical analysis of this decision will follow a discussion of
removal of state actions for coercive relief.
B. Removal of State Actions for Coercive Relief
Despite § 1441(b)'s incorporation of the "arising under" language
found in § 1331, the courts have taken the position that the removal ju-
risdiction of § 1441(b) should be construed narrowly and against re-
moval.2 0 The courts base this view on a purported congressional policy
reducing the removal jurisdiction of the federal courts. 3' The Supreme
Court has fostered this view by holding, in almost every Supreme Court
removal decision, that removal was not warranted. 132 Unfortunately, the
Court has taken this view by narrowly construing the § 1331 language
regarding original jurisdiction without assessing congressional intent to
reduce or expand original jurisdiction.'33
The Greenwald case, discussed previously an an exception to Wycoff in
declaratory judgment actions, involved a second action that had been re-
moved from state court."3 4 The dispute was between a state commissioner
of banks and a federally chartered savings and loan association. The bank
commissioner filed a civil action in state court seeking to require the sav-
ings and loan to pay interest on certain tax escrow accounts as provided
by state law. The commissioner's complaint alleged that the state statute
was not preempted by federal law, specifically, the Real Estate Settle-
ment Procedures Act of 1974. The savings and loan association removed
the case to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). After
removal, the savings and loan counterclaimed for declaratory relief alleg-
ing that federal law superseded the state law. The savings and loan also
filed a separate action for the same declaratory relief in the federal dis-
trict court.
While the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld jurisdiction in the fed-
eral declaratory judgment action, it viewed removal jurisdiction as un-
without specifically preempting a particular cause of action. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at
26-27 n.30.
19 Id. at 13. This category applies where the plaintiff has attempted to conceal the fed-
eral issue to avoid removal. See supra note 21.
"' Fajen v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir. 1982), relying
on Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941).
Kerr-McGee, 677 F.2d at 576.
"' See id. for cases cited at 576 n. 8.
' See infra note 212 and accompanying text.




clear and refused to resolve that question because "the district court
clearly had jurisdiction over the associations' separate declaratory judg-
ment action .... 135 Thus, the two cases in Greenwald involved pre-
cisely the same issue and involved federal statutes containing the same
language. Yet, in one, federal jurisdiction was doubtful while in the other
it was clear.
Unlike the jurisdictional doctrine in federal declaratory judgment ac-
tions, the type of relief requested by the plaintiff in the removal action
has not been determinative.1 3 Rather, the jurisdictional issue turns on
the extent of federal preemption asserted or whether the asserted state
claim is actually a federal claim.
1. Federal Preemption: The Claim or Defense Dilemma
Recently, in Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Williams,'3 7 the Supreme
Court turned down the opportunity to clarify the issue of whether a claim
of federal preemption could invoke the federal question jurisdiction of
the district court. Kerr-McGee maintained a disposal site used in the pro-
duction of compounds derived from radioactive natural ores. In April,
1980, the State of Illinois filed an action against Kerr-McGee in Illinois
state court alleging that the site violated the Illinois Environmental Pro-
tection Act and other state statutes pertaining to the disposal of hazard-
ous wastes. Kerr-McGee removed the case to federal district court. The
district court denied the state's motion for remand finding that the fed-
eral regulatory scheme under the Atomic Energy Act had preempted state
regulation of radioactive waste disposal. The district court reasoned that
the state's action necessarily involved an interpretation of federal law.
The district court then dismissed the action based on federal law.
The Seventh Circuit reversed.1 8 It noted that the Supreme Court had
never faced this jurisdictional issue directly.' 39 Nevertheless, it character-
ized federal preemption as a defense and relied on Gully for the proposi-
tion that federal question jurisdiction cannot be based on a defense."'
The court saw no reason for treating federal preemption any different
than other federal defenses. Kerr-McGee petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari.
In a rare dissent from the denial of certiorari, Justices White and Mar-
shall argued that the Supreme Court should resolve the question of fed-
Id. at 423.
"' Of course, the relief requested may be relevant to the determination of whether the
claim has been preempted. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
- 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1049 (1982).
"' Id.
I" 677 F.2d at 577.
1" Id.
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eral question jurisdiction based on federal preemption."' The dissenters
asserted that the Seventh Circuit decision in Kerr-McGee was in conflict
with the Second Circuit decision in North American Phillips Corp. v.
Emery Air Freight Corp." 2 Justice Blackmun, in an even rarer opinion
supporting denial of certiorari, denied that the two decisions were in
conflict.1
3
North American Phillips was another removal case where federal pre-
emption had not been previously determined. " The case involved a
claim by Norelco against Emery for lost cargo. After removal, Emery
raised three defenses based on its federal tariffs. Norelco replied that the
tariff was not controlling and that the common law of contracts governed
Emery's liability. The Second Circuit raised the jurisdictional issue sua
sponte and upheld jurisdiction.
Like the Seventh Circuit in Kerr-McGee, the Second Circuit relied on
the Supreme Court's 1936 decision in Gully."4 5 However, the court read
Gully as deciding the issue of whether federal law was a pivotal determi-
nation for resolution of the conflict. It also noted that the plaintiff's fail-
ure to plead federal law was not decisive. Since the substance of the claim
was loss of goods in interstate transportation by a common carrier, and
since federal law preempted the field to the exclusion of state law, the
Second Circuit upheld the district court's federal question jurisdiction.
Federal preemption of state law was the key to finding federal question
jurisdiction in North American Phillips; federal preemption of state law
was insufficient to sustain federal question jurisdiction in Kerr-McGee.
Both decisions relied on Gully. The different result is traceable to the
Seventh Circuit's characterization of federal preemption as a defense to
the state claim. This characterization necessarily converts the jurisdic-
tional determination into a pleading decision based on the well-pleaded
complaint rationale. The Second Circuit, however, did not characterize
federal preemption as a defense. It used federal preemption to reveal the
true character of the action. Even though the plaintiff did not plead fed-
eral law, the substance of the claim was based on a federal statute which
precluded conflicting state law.
It is significant that both courts were following Justice Cardozo's rea-
soning in Gully and yet each reached a different result. The Second Cir-
cuit read Gully as turning on whether a construction of federal law is
determinative of the dispute. If the true nature of the right to be estab-
.. 459 U.S. at 1050-51.
.42 579 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1978).
14 459 U.S. at 1049.
14 In other words, the Supreme Court did not determine that the federal law preempted
state law in this context. See Detroit Bond, 687 F.2d at 146, where the dissent viewed it as
"ridiculous" to deny jurisdiction because the Supreme Court had determined that federal
law preempted state law.




lished is federal, then there is federal jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit,
on the other hand, focused on the language in Gully stating that jurisdic-
tion cannot be based on anticipatory pleading: the court assumed that
federal preemption was in that category and therefore it did not consider
the applicability of the Gully reference to a federal immunity as suffi-
cient for federal jurisdiction. Rather, the court ignored the insistence in
Gully that it should look to the "basic," "necessary," and "essential" is-
sue in controversy and not the "collateral" or "merely possible."14
Neither the Second Circuit nor the Seventh Circuit felt bound by the
plaintiff's characterization of the action. However, the Seventh Circuit re-
quired, as a prerequisite to going behind the face of the complaint, a find-
ing that the plaintiff had artfully drafted the pleading with intent to de-
feat federal jurisdiction. 4" This restrictive approach leaves the
jurisdictional issue to the very artful drafter. If the drafter is clever
enough not to reveal any intention to defeat federal jurisdiction, then he
can defeat federal jurisdiction. If he is not so artful, and an intent to
avoid federal jurisdiction is detected, then federal jurisdiction is not de-
feated. Federal question jurisdiction then depends on whether the artful
drafter is artful enough to conceal the fact that he is being artful. How-
ever, federal jurisdiction should not depend on such speculative and su-
perficial grounds.
The opinions denying certiorari did not clarify the distinction between
North American Phillips and Kerr-McGee other than to recite that pre-
emption was a claim in one and a defense in the other. Yet, as indicated,
the difference in analysis is a result of differing views of the decision in
Gully. The Supreme Court has not acknowledged these varied interpreta-
tions of Gully, although it provided some clarification in the Franchise
Tax Board decision. 4 8 In that case, the state tax board had levied on
funds held by a trust operating under a benefit plan covered by the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The argument for re-
moval jurisdiction, characterized by the Supreme Court as the "best argu-
ment," was based on Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Assn. of
Machinists.49
In Avco, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized that fed-
eral preemption removes the state power and converts the claim as al-
leged from one based in state law to one based in federal law. Avco Cor-
poration had sought a state court injunction against the union to enjoin it
from striking. The case was removed to federal district court where the
court dissolved the temporary injunction and denied a motion to remand
to state court. On appeal, the issue was whether removal was proper. The
, See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
"4 677 F.2d at 577.
148 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
149 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967), afl'd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
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Sixth Circuit rejected the company's argument that its action in state
court was based solely on a state created right.'50 It noted that federal law
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act preemptively
applied to actions under that section. Thus,
all rights and claims arising from a collective bargaining agree-
ment in an industry affecting interstate commerce arise under
Federal law. State law does not exist as an independent source of
private rights to enforce collective bargaining contracts . . .. The
force of Federal preemption in this area of labor law cannot be
avoided by failing to mention Section 301 in the complaint.'51
The Supreme Court, in a short opinion by Justice Douglas, affirmed
the Sixth Circuit.8 2 It noted that an action under section 301 was con-
trolled by federal substantive law. Since federal substantive law con-
trolled the action under the collective bargaining agreement, it was an
action arising under the laws of the United States and removable under
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).5 s
Although the Supreme Court in Avco did not discuss how federal pre-
6 The company asserted that its action was founded on a breach of contract arising
under state law. The Sixth Circuit rejected this contention because the case involved the
violation of a no-strike provision in a collective bargaining agreement. The court did not
rule on the basis of exclusive federal jurisdiction because it noted that, "[hiad the action
remained in the State Court, the State Court, under the doctrine of Lincoln Mills and Lu-
cas Flour, was bound to apply Federal and not State law." 376 F.2d at 340. Although federal
preemption removed state law as a "source of private rights" it did not remove state court
jurisdiction. Also, it provided a basis for removal to federal court.
The Sixth Circuit in Avco also discussed the distinction between jurisdiction in the reme-
dial sense and jurisdiction over the subject matter. Id. at 341-42. Referring to § 4 of the
Norris-La Guardia Act which denied the power to grant injunctive relief, the court stated:
"The loss of the power to grant certain equitable remedies does not mean Federal Courts
have lost jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties." Id. at 341.
' 376 F.2d at 340.
"M 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
"I Id. at 560. The Seventh Circuit in Kerr-McGee, refused to follow Avco, asserting that
it had been criticized by the Supreme Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 244-45 (1970). 677 F.2d at 577 n. 10. However, the Boys Markets
court did not question the jurisdiction analysis in Avco. The problem addressed in Boys
Markets was the combined effect of Avco (allowing for removal to federal court) and Sin-
clair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 95 (1962) (holding that the anti-injunction provi-
sions of the Norris-La Guardia Act precluded a federal court from enjoining a strike). The
defending union could remove the state court proceeding to federal court under Avco and
thereby preclude an injunction against its strike even though it violated a no-strike clause.
The Supreme Court had decided in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962),
that Congress did not intend to disturb the pre-existing jurisdiction of the state courts.
Rather, § 301(a) "was to supplement, and not to encroach upon, the pre-existing jurisdic-
tion of the state courts." 398 U.S. at 245. The entire thrust of the Boys Markets opinion was
to re-examine Sinclair due to the resulting intrusion upon the jurisdiction of the state




emption was raised in the action 1 s4 federal law was being asserted defen-
sively by the union to avoid the company's attempt to enjoin the strike.
While the company wanted the dispute to be resolved by reference to
state law, the union wanted federal law to control and, accordingly, it
sought removal in order to have the federal judiciary construe the federal
law. Federal preemption of collective bargaining agreement disputes was
the basis for the union's argument that federal law should decide whether
the company had a right to an injunction. In other words, the union was
hopeful that federal law would provide it with a defense to the company's
breach of contract claim. Federal preemption did not constitute that de-
fense; it merely was the vehicle by which federal law would control over
the presumably conflicting state law. The company's failure to mention
federal law in its pleading of the case did not change the fact that federal
law controlled this type of dispute.'55 On the other hand, if the court had
applied the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal jurisdiction would have
been lacking.
2. Determining the Extent of Federal Preemption
The Franchise Tax Board court explained Avco as a separate jurisdic-
tional doctrine in the federal preemption context and as an exception to
the "master as aggressor" rationale of the well-pleaded complaint rule. It
explained that in Avco, "[tihe necessary ground of decision was that the
preemptive force of Section 301 was so powerful as to displace entirely
any state cause of action 'for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization.' "158 Thus, even though state law provided a
cause of action, section 301 displaced it and made the cause of action
"purely a creature of federal law."1 57 Therefore, the Court explained,
"Auco stands for the proposition that if a federal cause of action com-
pletely preempts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within
the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal
law."115
8
The Avco doctrine may distinguish North American Phillips
' The fact situation in Avco emphasizes the elusiveness of the federal claim-federal de-
fense distinction. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff's complaint, although couched in
state law language, was a federal claim under preemptive federal law. Of course, federal
preemption was being asserted by the defendant. The problem is whether federal preemp-
tion converted the state law claim to a federal claim or whether federal preemption of state
law was merely a defense.
The better approach is to address the issue on the basis of the nature of federal preemp-
tion as a fundamental Supremacy Clause principle. Which party raises the question should
not be the determinative issue.
"' This was the position of the Sixth Circuit. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
463 U.S. at 23.
157 Id.
I. [d. at 23-24.
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from Kerr-McGee. In North American Phillips, the Second Circuit de-
termined that the plaintiff's claim had been displaced by federal laws.' 9
It premised its conclusion in favor of federal jurisdiction on the determi-
nation that the carrier's federal tariffs "govern not only the nature and
extent of its liability, but also the nature and extent of the shipper's right
of recovery.""16 Accordingly, the Second Circuit reasoned that due to the
substance of the allegations, the complaint set "forth a claim arising
under federal law."16'
There is no indication that the North American court actually saw this
as a separate jurisdictional doctrine based on a "more powerful" federal
preemption. It merely noted that the federal program to establish na-
tional equality of rates and services indicated that Congress had occupied
the field to the exclusion of state law. Perhaps, that is the specific type of
preemption that displaces a state cause of action.
In Kerr-McGee the "displacement of state law" argument had been
presented to the Seventh Circuit."6 2 Kerr-McGee, relying on Avco, argued
that the assertion of federal preemption made the alleged state law claim
a federal claim. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument but agreed
that "if state law is preempted by federal law, a plaintiff may seek a rem-
edy in federal court." '' However, because federal preemption had been
raised by the defendant, it was "merely a defense to state law claims."' 6
Thus, the Seventh Circuit did not attribute significance to the displacing
effect of federal preemption. The party asserting preemption was the de-
termining factor.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Kerr-McGee is the finding in a
companion case that the Atomic Energy Act did not preempt the state
law regulating non-radiation hazards. 60 In other words, preemption did
not completely displace state law. Looking at Kerr-McGee after
Franchise Tax Board, the "less powerful" preemption involved could
have resulted in the conclusion that the state claim was not displaced by
federal law and therefore, "arising under" jurisdiction was lacking. Thus,
an assessment of the type of preemption asserted is a precursor of the
jurisdictional determination.
In light of the Franchise Tax Board clarification, the Second Circuit in
North American Phillips decided the issues in the proper sequence. It
first determined that Congress had completely occupied the field to the
exclusion of state law. Secondly, the court found federal jurisdiction as a
result of this complete displacement of state law. Perhaps the Seventh
See supra note 144.
161 579 F.2d at 233.
... Id. at 234.
162 677 F.2d at 577.
103 Id.
16, Id.




Circuit in Kerr-McGee actually made its determination in that order also,
despite the opinion's contrary indication.
As previously implied, it is not clear that finding that "federal law to-
tally occupies the field" is the dispositive answer to the jurisdictional in-
quiry.' A court must determine whether federal law displaces the partic-
ular state law cause of action.117 The Franchise Tax Board decision is
instructive in this way. There the Court distinguished Avco by comparing
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), construed
in Avco, to ERISA. The Court noted that ERISA did not preempt "every
state cause of action" relating to benefit plans within its coverage.6 s The
particular action involved in Franchise Tax Board was not a claim "of
central concern to the federal statute."' 9 Finally, the Court stated: "Fur-
thermore, ERISA does not provide an alternative cause of action in favor
of the State to enforce its rights, while Section 301 expressly supplied the
plaintiff in Avco with a federal cause of action to replace its preempted
state contract claim.'
70
Whether a two-prong test was being announced remains unclear. One
might conclude that if the federal statute preempted every state cause of
action relating to the dispute, Avco would control and "arising under"
jurisdiction would authorize removal. On the other hand, even if the fed-
eral statute does not preempt every state cause of action it may have re-
placed the particular cause of action being asserted. For example, if the
removed action in Franchise Tax Board had been a cause of action pro-
vided for in section 502(a) of ERISA, even a description in state law
terms would not preclude removal to federal court. One difficulty with
the Court's comparison is that the Avco ruling had the effect of eliminat-
ing the employer's claim for injunctive relief altogether. In Franchise Tax
Board, the Court states that "section 301 expressly supplied the plaintiff
in Avco a federal cause of action to replace its preempted state contract
claim."' 7' The court is correct in saying that the employer could proceed
under federal common law and assert that the union breached the collec-
"I' The Second Circuit in North Am. Phillips appears to have based its decision on this
implicit expression of preemption. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. However, to
the extent state law was displaced, the federal tariffs provided an alternative cause of
action.
"' This is the Avco doctrine as explained by the Supreme Court in Franchise Tax Bd.
However, Avco itself does not deal with the creation of an alternative cause of action. The
Sixth Circuit determined that the federal law displaced the state authority. In other words,
the federal substantive law controlled the enforcement of a no-strike clause in a collective
bargaining agreement. The Kerr-McGee court correctly read Arco on that point. 677 F.2d at
577 n. 10. However, the Supreme Court has re-explained Avco in Franchise Tax Bd. to
apply to the replacement of a specific cause of action.
'0' 463 U.S. at 25.




39Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
tive bargaining agreement. However, the federal law did not provide the
employer with the claim it desired-a claim for injunctive relief.
The Franchise Tax Board approach uses the phrase "cause of action"
without regard to the relief sought. On the other hand, it uses "the relief
sought" to compare the causes of action provided in ERISA with the
state tax board's cause of action. It states that ERISA may preempt
claims by beneficiaries to require the trustees to comply with the provi-
sions of a covered plan. However, ERISA does not preempt a state's ac-
tion to levy on trust funds. A cause of action for injunctive relief to pre-
vent a violation of the plan is distinguishable from a cause of action to
enforce a levy on trust funds. The court acknowledges that ERISA may
preempt enforcement of the state's levy on the trust funds.1 7 1 Neverthe-
less, federal district court jurisdiction is rejected because "an action to
enforce the levy is not itself preempted by ERISA.' 1 73 The jurisdictional
issue turns on whether the precise type of action pleaded by the plaintiff
has been replaced by a separate cause of action set forth in the federal
statute. Federal jurisdiction thus becomes dependent on nebulous plead-
ing law definitions of a "cause of action." Additionally, jurisdiction is de-
termined without regard to the fact that federal law may provide the con-
trolling rules of decision.
Moreover, the Franchise Tax Board decision permits federal jurisdic-
tion only if the federal statute replaced the state cause of action. The
court did not recognize that the federal statute may have eliminated the
state cause of action. In that event, a strong federal policy against a pre-
existing state claim for relief could not be heard in federal court; this
would produce an anomalous result. Perhaps this was an oversight and
the particular state cause of action is preempted if it is replaced or elimi-
nated by the federal statute.
Either situation requires a careful comparison of the claims available
under the federal statute and those previously cognizable in state law,
although this type of inquiry has not been made on a regular basis by the
federal courts. Most courts have looked at preemption as either defensive
or offensive. If this "more powerful" type of preemption is present, how-
ever, federal question jurisdiction is present regardless of which party
makes the assertion.
Thus, federal jurisdiction in the federal preemption context is even
more complicated than previously believed. The federal district courts
must determine not only whether there is preemption but must also iden-
tify whether it is a "powerful" preemption that preempts the state cause
of action.
This latter criterion depends on the relationship between the dispu-
tants under the federal statutory scheme. In other words, in Franchise
Id. at 26-27 n.30.




Tax Board, the Court referred to the specific plaintiff involved and the
failure of Congress to provide a cause of action for that particular plain-
tiff. The specific dispute raised by this aggressive plaintiff was not a sub-
ject of the federal regulation.
Under such an interpretation, the issue may be resolved by deciding
whether the plaintiff is given standing to assert a claim under the federal
statute. This issue may be the significance of the Second Circuit's deter-
mination in North American Phillips, holding that both the defendant's
liability and the plaintiffs "right of recovery" were governed by the fed-
eral regulations. 17 4 Since shipper's right to recover against a carrier was
provided for in the federal tariffs, the potential dispute between a shipper
and a carrier was a subject of the federal program.
The Supreme Court in Franchise Tax Board contrasted section 502(a)
of ERISA and section 301 of the LMRA on this point.' However, the
comparison also indicates that the aggressive plaintiff need not be specifi-
cally designated in the federal statute. Section 502(a) of ERISA desig-
nated the potential plaintiffs. Section 301 of the LMRA does not specify
a federal cause of action for certain plaintiffs; 176 it provides federal juris-
diction over labor-management contract disputes, including actions by an
employer. Accordingly, the test is the broader one of whether the plain-
tiffs state action comes "within the scope of' the claims enumerated or
permitted by the federal statute.
77
Thus, the Supreme Court uses a "standing" requirement to identify the
causes of action that are preempted. In Franchise Tax Board, the specific
cause of action enforcing a tax levy could only be brought by or on behalf
of a governmental entity. Clearly, ERISA did not attempt to create a fed-
eral claim for the enforcement of tax levies. Congress did not designate a
state taxing authority as a claimant within the regulatory scheme. There-
fore, the Court inescapably concluded that this plaintiff's cause of action
to enforce a tax levy was not preempted.
The Court's approach is consistent with its adoration for the "aggressor
as master" rationale. Federal jurisdiction is not meant to protect the fed-
eral regulatee nor federal regulatory programs. It is available only if the
"aggressive" disputant was a contemplated part of the regulatory scheme.
Of course, such a result is not inevitable. A different description of the
cause of action results in a different conclusion. The action in Franchise
Tax Board was brought to compel a trustee of an ERISA-covered plan to
disburse trust funds to a creditor of beneficiaries of the trust. Certainly,
the accessibility of trust funds to creditors relates to the central purposes
of the trust and ERISA itself-to provide for employees. By focusing on
579 F.2d at 233.
463 U.S. at 24-25.
... See id. at 25 n. 28.
"' The Supreme Court makes this suggestion in Franchise Tax Bd., id. at 24.
1984-85]
41Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
the effect of the relief sought, it is apparent that the plaintiff's claim is
within the scope of the ERISA claims and is a dispute contemplated by
Congress.
Thus, the judicial interpretation of the state cause of action is crucial.
In Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme Court chose to define the cause of
action by the precise identity of the plaintiff. This narrow construction
meant necessarily that the cause of action would not be within the scope
of ERISA. The Court may have taken this narrow approach because a
state was party plaintiff. The Court was persuaded by comity considera-
tions to allow the state to sue in its own courts. 78 Thus, such a narrow
interpretation of the cause of action may not preclude a federal district
court from hearing an ordinary judgment creditor's attempt to execute on
the trust.
The boundary of the Avco doctrine could be resolved easily if Congress
had preempted every state cause of action conceivably related to the sub-
ject matter being regulated. With ERISA, the Court asserts that "Con-
gress did not intend to preempt entirely every state cause of action relat-
ing to such plans."'179 The Court quotes from the disclaimer language in
section 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, stating that "[niothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulated insurance, banking, or securities. '" 18 Therefore, room for state
claims exists.
This disclaimer provision is hardly persuasive authority for the Court's
conclusion. First, the provision says nothing about tax liabilities. One
might conclude reasonably that ERISA may relieve one from state tax
laws. Second, and more to the point, the provision merely states that
ERISA will not relieve a person from liability. The fact that ERISA may
prevent the trustees from disbursing trust funds to the tax creditors of an
employee-beneficiary, does not relieve the employee from the tax liabil-
ity. The failure of ERISA to relieve persons from "any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities" says little about the
cause of action before the court or the causes of action covered by the
Act. The provision addresses only the immunities from state regulation
that are not provided and it is not an approval of other state claims. The
Court would have been on firmer ground by asserting that ERISA does
not preempt every state cause of action that may relate to a covered plan
in some conceivable way. This obtuse conclusion should be self-evident.
The Supreme Court implies that section 301(a) of the LMRA, con-
strued in Avco, falls into this category of preempting all actions "for vio-
lation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization""'
"' Id. at 21 n.22.
"' Id. at 25.
29 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2)(A).




thereby distinguishing it from ERISA.
Apparently, the Second Circuit in North American Phillips used this
approach with interstate carriers.'82 First, the court determined that the
federal law completely occupied the regulatory field. Second, it deter-
mined that the particular claim asserted was a claim provided by the fed-
eral statute. Therefore, the claim was a creature of federal law and federal
jurisdiction was upheld.
This analysis could explain Avco. Federal jurisdiction did not exist in
Auco because the federal statute provided the employer with an alterna-
tive cause of action; rather, jurisdiction existed because the federal law
had occupied the field entirely. Accordingly, if the employer had a claim
for breach of contract at all, it had to be based on federal law.
However, the Court in Franchise Tax Board refers to "an alternative
cause of action."'183 Under section 301 of the LMRA causes of action must
be for violations of the labor contract.18 4 An action "merely relating" to
the labor contract would not be sufficient. 18 5 Thus, the exclusion of state
law is limited to the cause of action described. It is not based on a federal
preemption "so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action
"186
In the final analysis, the Court distinguishes the Avco interpretation of
section 301 of the LMRA on the ground that a state agency filed suit in
Franchise Tax Board asserting a claim technically unrelated to ERISA,
while Avco involved precisely the type of dispute being addressed by sec-
tion 301 of the LMRA. Accordingly, even though the plaintiff in
Franchise Tax Board specifically asserted federal preemption as an issue,
and the plaintiff in Avco did not assert a federal issue, federal question
jurisdiction existed nonetheless in Avco but not in Franchise Tax
Board. 7
Thus, a federal statutory scheme that provides for certain types of ac-
tions without specifying the potential plaintiffs is a broader base for
"arising under" jurisdiction. Congressional attempts to define the type of
claim created will be the touchstone. Congress may preempt the specific
causes of action it mentions but this will not preempt all other state
causes of action related to the subject matter. In addition, Congress will
"' See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
,s' 463 U.S. at 26.
184 Id. at 25 n. 28.
I85 d.
'8' Id. at 23.
Arguably, the Court is being consistent by basing jurisdiction on the identity of the
party asserting federal preemption. Normally, that party, must be the plaintiff. If so, there
is removal jurisdiction. However, if that plaintiff happens to be a state seeking to enforce a
tax levy, the choice of a state forum must be honored.
If this is the nature of the Court's consistency, it does not assist in the development of a
useful and predictable definition of "arising under."
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have implicitly determined that only specific causes will be heard in a
federal forum while all others will be heard by state courts.
Such a result will occur even though the federal statutory scheme may
have expressly preempted the state rules of decision in the dispute. In
fact, the decisions as to whether the federal substantive rules do preempt
the state rules will be made by the state courts, not the federal courts.
Congressional intent is the hallmark of most preemption decisions,'8 8
the exception being cases where federal and state law are irreconcilably in
conflict. Ironically, on the consequential issue of what court system will
be the decision-maker, the Supreme Court, without any assessment of
congressional intent, has limited the application of preemption to specific
claims that replace state law claims.
The only reason for creating this labyrinth of jurisdictional tests is the
clash between the Court's desire to hold to the well-pleaded complaint
rule and the patent presence of federal law in the forefront of the case. If
the Court would simply recognize that federal jurisdiction should not de-
pend on whether this ultimate issue of federalism is asserted by an ag-
gressor or a non-aggressor, the complications would be minimized. How-
ever, the Court has now fashioned a separate jurisdictional doctrine for
preemption of the plaintiff's causes of action. In the interest of restricting
the inquiry to the aggressor's description of the cause, the Court has
turned the judicial inquiry back into a quest for an ill-defined "cause of
action." This was the approach in Hurn v. Oursler8 9 which the court
viewed as outmoded after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 190
C. Removal of State Actions for Declaratory Relief
After a discussion of federal question jurisdiction in federal declaratory
judgment actions and in removal actions, a third category to be investi-
gated is a combination of both. The issue is presented where the plaintiff
files a declaratory judgment action in state court relying on a state de-
claratory relief law and the defendant removes to federal court. The de-
fendant argues that there is removal jurisdiction because federal law has
preempted the plaintiff's state law claim.
The complexities involved in this category of cases may not be unex-
pected after understanding the variations in both the federal declaratory
judgment actions and the removal cases. In the former, the variations de-
pend on the aggressor's threatened claim and on whether coercive relief
was requested or could have been requested. In the removal cases, the
"I See supra note 4. The Court acknowledged that congressional intent is the cornerstone
of federal preemption in Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
152-53 (1982).
289 U.S. 238 (1933).




variations depend on the extent of federal preemption.
A major inquiry in the removed state declaratory judgment action is
whether the jurisdictional determination is limited by Skelly Oil to the
aggressor's complaint or whether the inquiry should shift to the "true"
aggressor's threatened claim as explained in Wycoff."" A third option is
that Skelly Oil and Wycoff should not apply at all and the assessment
should be made as if the complaint were for traditional coercive relief.
A discussion of two cases should provide direction: the Third Circuit's
opinion in La Chemise Lacoste v. The Alligator Co., Inc., 92 which was
the authoritative case on this issue prior to 1983, and the Supreme
Court's opinion in Franchise Tax Board,'9 3 where jurisdiction was re-
jected but on different grounds from those asserted in LaCoste.
In Lacoste, a French corporation filed an action in Delaware state court
seeking both a declaration of its ownership of and right to use a crocodile
emblem as a trademark, and an injunction against interference. The de-
fendant removed to federal district court. The defendant argued that
there was federal jurisdiction under the Wycoff addition to Skelly Oil
because it had threatened a coercive federal action against Lacoste. 9"
The district court accepted jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Wycoff was limited
to Federal Declaratory Judgment Act cases. 195 The court saw Wycoff as
limiting federal jurisdiction based on the functional roles of the dispu-
tants. Wycoff had shifted the jurisdictional inquiry to the actual aggres-
sor's threatened claim. However, the Third Circuit reasoned that such an
approach could not apply in removal cases because only a defendant may
remove to federal court. Applying Wycoff would allow the "functional
plaintiff" the right to remove although actual plaintiffs do not have such
a statutory right.'96 Thus, the court refused to look to the threatened
claim. Since the court found no federal question in plaintiff's complaint,
it directed that the case be remanded to state court.
In Franchise Tax Board, a state tax board sought a state declaratory
judgment holding that the Federal Employees Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act of 1974 (ERISA) did not preempt state law and deny the trustees
of an ERISA-covered plan authority to honor tax levies on trust funds.
o, See supra part III, for a discussion of these limitations in the federal declaratory judg-
ment action.
92 506 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1974).
463 U.S. 1 (1983).
The declaratory defendant, The Alligator Co., Inc., argued that it had threatened to
sue Lacoste under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., to protect its trademark. 506
F.2d at 342. The Third Circuit rejected the argument, in part because the threatened action
"was not necessarily federal in nature." Id. at 346. However, it premised this conclusion by
noting "the absence of a preemptive trademark statute." Id. In the context of a preemptive
federal statute, the court would have found jurisdiction if it applied Wycoff.
"' 506 F.2d at 343.
' Id. at n. 4.
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The defendants removed the case to federal district court. The United
States Supreme Court ruled that the district court lacked jurisdiction and
directed that the case be remanded to state court.
However, the Supreme Court did not follow the Lacoste approach. The
Supreme Court initially noted that Skelly Oil was not "directly control-
ling" because it involved a Federal Declaratory Judgment Act case. 97
Nevertheless, it applied Skelly Oil to the state declaratory judgment
claim. The Court stated: "Yet while Skelly Oil itself is limited to the Fed-
eral Declaratory Judgment Act, fidelity to its spirit leads us to extend it
to state declaratory judgment actions as well."'9 8
Furthermore, unlike the Third Circuit in Lacoste, the Supreme Court
purportedly applied Skelly Oil as amplified by Wycoff. The Court stated
that the federal courts lack removal jurisdiction "when a federal question
is presented by a complaint for a state declaratory judgment, but SkeUy
Oil would bar jurisdiction if the plaintiff had sought a federal declaratory
judgment."' 99 It opined that federal courts had "consistently" entertained
declaratory actions by alleged patent infringers, "on the theory that an
infringement suit by the declaratory judgment defendant would raise a
federal question."'' 00 The theory of the Wycoff dictum was that the de-
claratory defendant's threatened claim for coercive relief could establish
him as a true aggressor thereby bringing the case within federal court
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court apparently approved this approach.
Consistent with Wycof[, the Court turned to the trustees' claims.2 9 '
Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA grants the trustees of ERISA-covered plans a
cause of action for injunctive relief to protect their rights under ERISA.
Such an action is governed exclusively by federal law. Under the Wycoff
dictum, federal court jurisdiction could be based on that threatened fed-
eral action for injunctive relief. Since Wycoff was being applied, federal
jurisdiction would appear to follow.
However, the Supreme Court stopped the inquiry at this point by stat-
ing the following: "If CLVT could have sought an injunction under
ERISA against application to it of state regulations that require acts in-
consistent with ERISA, does a declaratory judgment suit by the State
'arise under' federal law? We think not." ' 2 The Court did not reject ju-
risdiction by refusing to apply Wycoff to a state declaratory judgment
action as the Third Circuit did in Lacoste. Rather, it carved out an excep-
tion to Wycoff because the action for declaratory relief was brought by a
17 463 U.S. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.at 19 n. 19. Although the Court stated that the federal courts have "consistently
adjudicated" these actions, its only case citation was E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple A Spe-
cialty Co., 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1937).





state. It simply noted that there were "good reasons" why federal courts
should not entertain such actions. 0 3
The "good reasons" stated by the Court are not self-evident. First, the
opinion stated that the states are not prejudiced by an inability to come
to federal court in the face of a threatened federal injunction action.20 4
Second, the Court relied on the grant of jurisdiction in ERISA that desig-
nated the potential plaintiffs as an indication that Congress implicitly de-
nied federal jurisdiction over claims brought by other plaintiffs.10
The Court's first "good" reason is a paradox. Obviously, the state is not
prejudiced by an "inability to come to federal court for a declaratory
judgment." The state has no desire to come to federal court. It wants the
Supremacy Clause issue decided in its "home" courts by the judicial arms
of its sovereignty. It is the federal regulatee that wants a federal court
decision.
The Court's second supporting argument is no more enlightening. The
fact that Congress created specific claims for specific categories of plain-
tiffs does not answer the Court's final inquiry under the Skelly Oil and
Wycoff analysis. The Court did not deny that ERISA grants the trustees
a claim for coercive relief. Rather, it retreated from the Wycoff amplifica-
tion of Skelly Oil by focusing on the state declaratory plaintiff's claim
and the identity of the plaintiff.
Congressional inclusion or exclusion of the state as a plaintiff under
ERISA has little to do with the Court's "we think not" response to the
established, and approved, jurisdictional analysis. This inquiry is more
relevant to the "creation" test of American Well Works, basing jurisdic-
tion on whether the plaintiff's claim was created by federal law. 0 ' Of
course, the Court already determined that it was'looking at a state claim.
Thus, the American Well Works approach is inapplicable unless the
Court is implicitly proposing an expanded use of the Holmes' test. In the
latter event, the federal nature of the claim would be sufficient for federal
jurisdiction even though the plaintiff was a state. Perhaps, the reference
to the ERISA claims was to emphasize that the Court's decision was lim-
ited to a state action asserting a claim created by state law.
Despite the uncertainty of its explanations, the Court revealed the ac-
tual basis of its holding. It acknowledged that the state went "to great
lengths to avoid federal-court resolution" of the Supremacy Clause is-
sue.2 7 The Court also noted that such cases will only be heard in federal
court where "the defendant has removed the case to federal court. 20
8
"I Id. at 21.
2G4 Id.
205 Id.
2 See supra note 29.
"' 463 U.S. at 21 n. 22. This admission is patently contrary to the Court's concern about
the state being prejudiced.
208 Id.
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Then the court stated the following: "Accordingly, it is perhaps appropri-
ate to note that considerations of comity make us reluctant to snatch
cases which a State has brought from the courts of that State, unless
some clear rule demands it.'"209 Thus, the actual basis of the decision is
comity for the sovereignty of the states and the general jurisdiction of
state courts.
The Court effectively ruled that it was not bound to allow federal court
jurisdiction even where its own doctrine indicates that jurisdiction exists,
thus inferring that jurisdictional doctrine is not mandatory. As previously
discussed, there was little concern that "some clear rule demands it" be-
cause the Supreme Court has been unable to fashion a clear rule in this
area. Accordingly, as a practical matter, the exercise of jurisdiction is
discretionary.
It is difficult to speculate on the basis for the Court's holding, other
than comity. The Court reasoned that the state tax board's action for
declaring the validity of its state law was "sufficiently removed from the
spirit of necessity and careful limitation of district court jurisdiction that
informed our statutory interpretation in Skelly Oil and Gully .... 210
This reasoning is difficult to unravel. Undoubtedly, both Skelly Oil and
Gully saw a need to limit federal court jurisdiction. They stand for the
proposition that federal jurisdiction should be limited to cases where fed-
eral questions are "essential" or at the "forefront." Perhaps the Court
intuitively viewed the tax board's action as one that raised a federal issue
only in a peripheral way. However, its own analysis belies this conclusion:
"Not only does appellant's request for a declaratory judgment under Cali-
fornia law clearly encompass questions governed by ERISA, but appel-
lant's complaint identifies no other questions as a subject of controversy
between the parties." 1 No question exists that the federal preemption
issue was the essence of the tax board's declaratory judgment claim.
In the absence of an understandable explanation, the only reasonable
conclusion is that the Court's notions of comity were offended by the ap-
plication of the removal statute in this context. It is an affront to the
state to allow such an action to be removed from its courts. Furthermore,
the Court prefers that the state courts carry the burden of deciding the
federal preemption issue in order to lessen the federal caseload. Accord-
ingly, the Court engaged in mental gymnastics to distinguish this case
from cases that could have been brought originally in federal court as
"arising under" federal law. Its own analysis under Skelly Oil and Wycoff
had to be aborted on comity and "good reason" grounds because the inev-
itable result was the existence of original jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Court reveals an aversion for the application of the
209 Id.
.1 Id. at 21-22.




removal statute in this type of case. It appears to have followed the
proper relationship between 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by
denying removal jurisdiction because it found original jurisdiction lack-
ing. However, this is a subterfuge. In actuality, the court rejected original
jurisdiction because it did not favor removal jurisdiction.2 2 This conclu-
sion is apparent from the Court's confession that it was "reluctant to
snatch cases" from the state courts.2 13 The only way cases could be
"snatched" is by the defendant's exercise of the congressional right to
remove the case. The Court admitted that in the absence of the removal
statutes, this type of case would not be decided in the federal courts, de-
spite the federal issues involved.
In reality, the Court is reversing the proper construction of section 1331
as a predicate to deciding removal jurisdiction. Removal jurisdiction is
based on original jurisdiction, and not vice versa.
Of course, the Court's deference for the state is consistent with the
erstwhile "aggressor as master" rationale. The state, as a sovereign, is en-
titled to special rights to control its actions. It was the actual aggressor in
this dispute seeking to compel the trustees to disburse trust funds. Since
the declaratory device was part of a state law claim, the pleading was
proper. Therefore, the state's choice of the state forum should control.
Even though the Court eventually did not apply Wycoff, it fails to
mention Lacoste. In Lacoste, the Third Circuit held that Wycoff does not
apply to a state declaratory judgment action removed to federal court be-
cause a "functional plaintiff' cannot remove.2 14 This approach would
have provided a different result. In Franchise Tax Board, the plaintiff
asserted a federal question while the plaintiff in Lacoste did not. Thus,
the Lacoste approach would have meant federal jurisdiction even without
applying Wycoff. Furthermore, the Court effectively rejected the Lacoste
approach."'
The fact that the state declaratory judgment action constituted a sub-
stantive cause of action presented a difficult problem for the Court2 1
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was "procedural only." This dis-
tinction was important because if the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act
did more than provide a remedy, there would be jurisdictional implica-
tions under accepted Supreme Court doctrine.
Under American Well Works, if federal law created the cause of action,
"' As to whether this bias against removal jurisdiction was decisive in Gully also, see
supra note 41
463 U.S. at 21 n. 22.
See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
2" This conclusion is based on the Court's pronounced "holding" that the Skelly Oil
analysis applies to state declaratory judgment actions. 463 U.S. at 18-19. The Court then
looked to the declaratory defendant's threatened action, as suggested in Wycofl. Id.
"' Id. at 17 n. 16.
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it was within "arising under" jurisdiction of the federal courts." 7 Justice
Frankfurter, an ardent supporter of this "creation test," sought to avoid
its application to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. Therefore, find-
ing that the Act did not create a federal cause of action and thereby pro-
vide "arising under" jurisdiction over cases not cognizable previously in
the federal courts was essential. Thus, the courts had to look to the un-
derlying claim and characterize it as state or federal by determining its
"essence" as directed by Gully. In Skelly Oil, the Court found the under-
lying cause of action to be a creature of state law and denied jurisdiction.
The Skelly Oil jurisdictional interpretation was limited to the federal
statute. It would not apply to a state declaratory judgment statute. As the
Supreme Court in Franchise Tax Board noted, the California statute pre-
dated the federal Act and was interpreted as providing a substantive
claim.2"'
However, this fact does not present a problem under the American
Well Works test because the claim for declaratory relief is created by
state law. The fact that a state created claim exists is not determinative
since the "creation" test is inclusive rather than exclusive.2 1 Federal ju-
risdiction still exists with a state claim if it is necessary to construe a
substantial issue of federal law. Moreover, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the allegation of the lack of preemption was an essential part
of the tax board's claim for declaratory relief. Thus, the finding of a sub-
stantive cause of action for declaratory relief and a substantial federal
element should have meant federal removal jurisdiction. However, the
Supreme Court stated that the state cause of action for declaratory relief
would be treated as if it were an original action seeking declaratory relief
in federal court.220 In other words, it would be treated as if it were not a
substantive cause of action.
The fact that a state cause of action for declaratory relief exists raises
another issue not addressed in Franchise Tax Board. A problem would
arise if the tax board had commenced its action in federal district court
asserting a state claim for declaratory relief based on an essential ques-
tion of federal preemption. The comity considerations would be absent
since the case would not be "snatched" into federal court. There also
2" See supra note 58.
222 463 U.S. at 17 n. 16.
212 See supra note 58. This point originates with Judge Friendly in T. B. Harms Co. v.
Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court in Franchise Tax Bd. expressly
endorsed this limitation of the American Well Works test. 463 U.S. at 8-9. In fact, Justice
Brennan asserts that Justice Frankfurter had acknowledged its rejection "as an exclusionary
principle." Id. at 9. Interestingly, Justice Frankfurter's concession about the American Well
Works test was in the context of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, not origi-
nal jurisdiction of the district courts. See Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 270-72
(1944)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).




would not be a problem of expanding federal court jurisdiction by the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act since the plaintiff would be relying on
the California statute. Thus, the concern of Skelly Oil and Wycoff would
not be present. Accordingly, federal jurisdiction would appear to exist.
Nevertheless, since the Supreme Court in Franchise Tax Board held
that the removed state declaratory judgment action should be treated as
if it had been an original action in federal court under the Federal De-
claratory Judgment Act, a different result in an original action based on
the state statute would be anomalous. Thus, the Supreme Court might
apply Skelly Oil and deny jurisdiction. These patent inconsistencies
demonstrate the discretionary nature of federal jurisdictional doctrine.
The Franchise Tax Board decision was concerned that Skelly Oil could
be avoided by the filing and removal of state declaratory judgment ac-
tions. However, this concern seems specious since the tax board did not
want the case heard in federal court and the trustees did. It would take a
collusive effort to arrange to bypass Skelly Oil by the state declaratory
action.
The Court would have the same concern with an original federal court
action asserting the state declaratory judgment claim. If the Skelly Oil
limitations do not apply, the federal courts would have jurisdiction. Thus,
the unfortunate Skelly Oil decision, based on a misconception of the well-
pleaded complaint rule, is expanded to cover the possible loophole cre-
ated because the states have a more reasonable view of their declaratory
judgment statutes.
In the concluding segment of the Franchise Tax Board opinion, the
Supreme Court attempted to justify its jurisdictional doctrine. It stated
that its concern was "consistent application of a system of statutes con-
ferring original federal court jurisdiction .... "221 The manner in which
consistency and predictability will result from the Court's opinion is diffi-
cult to see. In its actual holding, the Court stated:
We hold that a suit by state tax authorities both to enforce its
levies against funds held in trust pursuant to an ERISA-covered
employee benefit plan, and to declare the validity of the levies
notwithstanding ERISA, is neither a creature of ERISA itself nor
a suit of which the federal courts will take jurisdiction because
it turns on a question of federal law. 222
Of course, it is the category of cases asserting state claims but requiring
interpretation of a substantial question of federal law that need judicial
rules that can be applied in a consistent fashion. At the same time, the
Court's holding implies: "This case is not in that category." Such a hold-
ing is hardly informative enough to promote consistency.
:21 Id. at 27.
11 Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
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In the final analysis, the Court decided the case on comity grounds and
"good reasons" that were not articulated. It is unclear whether its holding
would extend to non-state plaintiffs. Arguably, the decision is limited to
actions by states to enforce tax levies and to declare the validity of state
law.
Perhaps the Court was more concerned with clarifying jurisdictional
doctrine in general than it was with the rationale for deciding the particu-
lar case since it went to great lengths to trace and describe the well-
pleaded complaint rule and the Skelly Oil and Wycoff principles relating
to declaratory judgments. In dictum, described as ratio decidendi, the
Court approved its historical doctrines, without acknowledging the incon-
sistencies and ambiguities involved in each. '
The significance of the holding in Franchise Tax Board is the rejection
of original federal court jurisdiction despite the dictates of its "sacred"
jurisdictional dogma. The clear implication is that federal question juris-
diction is discretionary and that federal court discretion should be exer-
cised against jurisdiction.
An underlying basis of the Court's decision is the philosophy expressed
in Skelly Oil that the volume of federal court litigation should be limited
by a narrow view of jurisdiction. The Court based its approach on "what
Skelly Oil called 'the current of jurisdictional legislation since the Act of
March 3, 1875; 339 U.S. at 637, with an eye to practicality and neces-
sity."2 ' In short, the Court's holding was intended to implement a per-
ceived policy directing a retraction of original federal court jurisdiction. It
did little to define the statutory phrase "arising under" federal law.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's adoption of the Skelly Oil philoso-
phy as a congressional policy reflected by the "current" of jurisdictional
legislation is simply in error. The current of congressional legislation is
expansive of federal jurisdiction, not retractive. Even the few changes
made by the Judicial Code of 1948 "were in the direction of expanding
federal jurisdiction.1 225 While earlier amendments to section 1331 had in-
creased the amount in controversy, a 1976 amendment exempted actions
against the United States from the $10,000 minimum and a 1980 amend-
ment eliminated the amount in controversy altogether.2 1
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 included section 1343, which expanded
federal court jurisdiction over civil rights actions. 2 7 In 1954, Congress de-
leted the monetary limitation that section 1346(a) imposed on tax refund
"I' The Court acknowledged that its approach was more historical than logical, id. at 4,
and that it produces "awkward" results. Id. at 12.
224 Id. at 20.
225 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WEEKSTEIN AND J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.61[1], at 644.1 (2d ed. 1984).
2 Id. at 644.2.




actions, thus expanding federal court jurisdiction."2 8 In 1976, Congress en-
acted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act conferring original federal
court jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns without regard
to the amount in controversy.22 9
The list of congressional actions expanding original federal court juris-
diction is extensive. It demonstrates beyond doubt that the "current" of
legislative policy is not to limit federal court jurisdiction. If such a policy
exists, it is the policy of the justices themselves. It is misleading to appro-
priate language in a 1950 decision characterizing early twentieth century
legislation and to assert that it is indicative of congressional policy more
than thirty years later. The origin of the policy should not be disguised. If
it is judicial, the Court should acknowledge that fact.
In fact, the Court is not blameless for its treatment of Congress
throughout the opinion. In its discussion of Skellv Oil and its limitations
on the application of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the Court
noted that Congress has the power to alter Skelly Oil, but "has declined
to make such a change." 3° Of course, this is correct. However, since the
Supreme Court caused the "awkward" results produced by the Shelly Oil
decision, it is the Court who should reappraise Skelly Oil.
Notwithstanding the Court's uninformative holding and its sacrosanct
treatment of Skelly Oil, the Franchise Tax Board decision provided di-
rection in dictum for federal removal jurisdiction over state declaratory
judgment actions. To preserve Skelly Oil, the lower federal courts must
engage in pleading fictions. Ignoring the actual situation, the courts must
treat the removed state declaratory judgment action as if it were a Fed-
eral Declaratory Judgment Act claim.
As previously indicated, the necessity for such a fiction demonstrates
the weakness of the judicial doctrine. The use of fictions does not com-
mand respect for the Court's authority. It complicates tthis threshold issue
which requires consistency. The better approach would be the rejection of
Skelly Oil.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the auspices of the well-pleaded complaint rule, the Supreme
Court has made the threshold issue of federal jurisdiction perplexing and
unpredictable. The Court's adoration for the "aggressor as master" ra-
tionale of the rule has entrenched jurisdictional doctrine in complexity
unbecoming the statutory phrase "arising under" federal law.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged two general situations in which
federal district court jurisdiction exists. One is where federal law creates
the plaintiff's cause of action. The second is where a cause of action cre-
... 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982).
... 28 U.S.C § 1330 (1982).
... 463 U.S. at 18 n.17.
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ated by state law requires the construction of a substantial question of
federal law.
The Court has used the well-pleaded complaint rule primarily in the
latter category to determine whether the federal issue is essential. It has
limited this inquiry to the aggressive party's description of the action due
to traditional notions of the court system as a forum for approved com-
bat. As a result, present jurisdictional doctrines are intertwined with su-
perficial, and often speculative, characterizations of disputants as aggres-
sive or non-aggressive.
In the context of modern disputes where parties challenge the source of
the controlling regulatory requirements, jurisdiction should be based on
what law governs the controversy. If federal law has preemptive force, the
dispute "arises under" federal law.
54https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss4/5
